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Abstract 
A responsibility inference process and emotion mediation model (Weiner, 1995) 
were tested in self perception and person perception. In addition to the validity 
of the responsibility inference process and model, I examined whether there 
were systematic differences in the self and person perceptions of depressed 
and non-depressed respondents. Two hundred and seventeen undergraduate 
university students from the University of Northern British Columbia completed 
questionnaire packages which included (i) the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) 
(Beck, 1967), (ii) the Happiness Measure Scale (Fordyce, 1988), and (iii) two 
Reasons for Misfortune questionnaires. Scores from the BDI were used to 
separate respondents into depressed and non-depressed groups. The 
Reasons for Misfortune questionnaires assessed attributions about controllable 
and uncontrollable causes of misfortunes that happen to self and to others .. 
The data supported the responsibility inference process and, in general, the 
emotion mediational model postulated by Weiner (1995). There were no 
systematic differences attributable to depression level. However, there were 
systematic self-other differences in responsibility, emotion, and action tendency 
judgements. These results were interpreted as evidence of an illusion of control 
bias (Langer, 1975). 
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Responsibility Judgements About Stigmas: Does Depression Matter? 
Attribution theory has contributed a great deal to understanding the linkages 
between cognitive appraisals, emotions, and actions. Weiner's (1995) 
attributional approach to social motivation incorporates two related concepts: 
the responsibility inference process and the responsibility judgement model 
(Weiner 1986; 1995). The responsibility inference process (Weiner, 1995) 
provides an explanation for people's responses to social events that have 
positive or negative consequences. Specifically, the responsibility inference 
process addresses how causal attributions affect judgements about personal 
responsibility for events. According to Weiner (1995), the responsibility 
inference process operates when (i) an individual is believed to have caused an 
event, (ii) the cause is believed to be controllable by that person, and (iii) there 
are no mitigating circumstances. Thus, people are held responsible for an 
event if they are perceived to have caused the event, when the cause is 
believed to be controllable by them, and when there were no known extenuating 
circumstances for the cause. On the other hand, the responsibility inference 
process does not operate (i.e., responsibility judgements are not made) if any of 
the three conditions are not met (Weiner, 1995). 
The responsibility judgement model (Weiner, 1986; 1995) basically proposes 
that thoughts determine feelings and feelings, in tum, serve as guides to 
behavior (see Appendix A). That is, emotions are considered to be motivators 
of behavior. According to Weiner (1993; 1995), perceivin·g others to be not 
responsible for their negative outcomes tends to elicit pity and prosocial 
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behavior (Weiner, 1986; 1993). However, perceiving others to be responsible 
for their problems, tends to elicit anger and negative behavior reactions, or little 
prosocial behavior (cf. Graham & Weiner, 1993; Juvonen & Weiner, 1993). 
There is a substantial body of empirical research that exists that supports a link 
between the responsibility inference process and an emotion mediational model 
of social behavior. 
Review of Research 
Weiner's (1974, 1979, 1986) attributional theory of social motivation has 
been examined for its appropriateness along many dimensions. The role of 
perceived causal controllability in determining affective and behavioral 
consequences of negative events/outcomes is perhaps the most extensively 
examined (Deaux, 1976a, 1976b; Ickes & Kidd, 1976; Meyer & Mulherin, 1980; 
Reisenzein, 1986; Schmidt & Weiner, 1988; Weiner, 1974, 1979, 1980a, 
1980b). For example, Weiner, Graham, & Chandler (1982) examined the 
relationship between the three causal attributional dimensions (locus, stability, 
and controllability) and feelings of anger, pity, and guilt. In these studies, 
university students were asked to describe situations in which they experienced 
anger, pity, or guilt and then to provide the cause of those situations. Pity was 
related to uncontrollable causes for negative events whereas anger and guilt 
(self-directed anger) were related to controllable causes for negative events 
(Weiner et al., 1982). These results, and the results of a growing number of 
studies, are consistent with the causal pathways identified in Weiner's (1986) 
theory. 
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Responsibility judgments for stigmas 
One interesting area of investigation is affective and behavioral responses to 
the "onset controllability" of stigmas. Perceived controllability, pity and anger, 
and helping responses were examined using 10 stigmas (Weiner, Perry, & 
Magnusson, 1988). The controllability of the onset of the stigmas was 
manipulated and the ratings of responsibility were examined using the following 
stigmas: AIDS, Alzheimer's Disease, blindness, cancer, child abuser, drug 
addiction, heart disease, obesity, paraplegia, and Vietnam War syndrome. The 
uncontrollable conditions elicited more pity, less anger, and were more likely to 
result in social support than the controllable situations. Without controllability 
information, low responsibility ratings were given for physically based, or 
uncontrollable, stigmas such as Alzheimer's Disease, blindness, cancer, 
paraplegia, Vietnam War Syndrome and heart disease. In contrast, high 
responsibility ratings were given to more behaviorally based, or seemingly 
controllable stigmas such as AIDS, child abuser, obesity, and drug addiction 
(Weiner et al., 1988). 
In a similar study conducted by Schwarzer & Weiner (1991), emotional 
reactions toward disease-related stigmas and the probability of social support 
were examined. Again, the controllability of the onset of the stigmas was 
manipulated. Pity was found to be a strong predictor for social support given a 
life-threatening stigma (cancer, AIDS) that was perceived to have an 
uncontrollable onset. For the behavioral stigmas (obesity, anorexia), anger was 
found to predict the likelihood of social support. A stigma that was perceived to 
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have a controllable onset elicited higher levels of anger and less social support 
(Schwarzer & Weiner, 1991 ). 
AIDS: Responsibility judgments 
Perhaps the most controversial stigma in recent years is AIDS. In a study 
conducted by Graham, Weiner, Giuliano, & Williams (1993), five known causes 
of AIDS were presented to subjects in an effort to determine how sympathy and 
anger were related to the perceived controllability of contracting AIDS. The five 
causes given were: blood transfusion, normal sexual behavior, frequent casual 
sex, homosexual behavior, and drug u~e. Responsibility ratings were found to 
b~ highest for drug use, followed by homosexual behavior and promiscuous 
sex. The lowest rating for responsibility was found for AIDS contracted through 
a blood transfusion. The affect data showed that sympathy and anger are 
inversely related. Blood transfusions (uncontrollable) elicited the highest ratings 
for sympathy whereas drug use (controllable) elicited the highest ratings for 
anger (Graham et al., 1993). These results support previous conclusions that 
affective reactions to stigmas are influenced by the perceived controllability of 
causes (e.g., Weiner et al., 1988). 
Political ideology and responsibility judgments 
Other researchers have examined how political ideology affects causal 
attributions and thus responsibility judgments. Zucker and Weiner (1993) found 
that conservatism was related to attributions of personal causality, 
controllability, anger, and blame for poverty, and conservatives felt less pity and 
were less likely to help victims of poverty. In addition, conservatives were more 
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likely to attribute homosexuality (Mallery, 1990; Whitley, 1990) and obesity 
(Crandall, 1992; Crandall & Biernat, 1990) to factors controllable by the 
individuals. It appears that political ideology--a cognitive framework--influences 
attributions made regarding the causes of negative outcomes/events and thus 
the degree of personal responsibility for those outcomes/events. 
Hostile attributional style 
How attributional styles affect behavior has been examined by Graham, 
Hudley, & Williams (1992). They found that "aggressive" youths (determined by 
peers', teachers' and self ratings) tended to perceive that harm to themselves 
by others was done intentionally, and they became more angry and were more 
likely to retaliate aggressively in situations of interpersonal harm 'than were 
youths who were not generally deemed aggressive. In an effort to determine if 
they could change the hostile attributions, Hudley & Graham (1993) conducted 
a study on aggressive youths participating in a cognitive/behavioral-based 
attribution intervention program. They found that after the intervention program, 
aggressive youths showed a less hostile intentionality bias and engaged in less 
retaliatory behavior. These results supported the implementation of cognitive 
change programs for reducing aggressive behavior in adolescents. 
Unfortunately, "anger was relatively uninfluenced by participation in the 
experimental intervention" (Hudley and Graham, 1993, p. 135). 
The research discussed thus far supports the thought-affect-action causal 
pathways outlined by Weiner's (1986) attributional theory of social motivation. 
Comparisons have been made between different stigmas, conservative and 
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liberal political ideologies, and attributional styles of aggressive and non-
aggressive youth. A consistent finding has been that the perceived 
controllability of the cause of an outcome/event influences responsibility 
judgments which in turn determine subsequent emotions and actions. 
Predictions From the Responsibility Judgement Model 
Person perception 
The person perception implications of these different attributions in Weiner's 
(1986, 1995) theory are as follows: people who perceive the cause of a victim's 
misfortune to be personally controllable by the victim should hold the victim 
responsible and indicate more anger and more negative behaviors (e.g., 
avoidance/neglect) toward the victim (see Appendix A). Alternatively, people 
who perceive a victim's misfortune to be due to factors which are not 
controllable by the victim should not hold the victim responsible and should 
indicate less anger and less negative behaviors (or even positive behaviors) 
toward the victim (see Appendix A). 
Self perception 
The self perception implications of different controllability attributions can be 
predicted from Weiner's theory (1986, 1995), as follows: people who perceive 
the cause of their own negative outcomes to be personally controllable should 
hold themselves responsible, become angry or irritated with themselves and 
should initiate a personal behavioral change (see Appendix B). On the other 
hand, those who perceive the cause of their negative outcome to be 
uncontrollable by both themselves and anyone else should not make 
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responsibility judgments, and should become sad or filled with self-pity which in 
turn should lead to a state of passivity (see Appendix B). There is also the 
possibility that a person may view the cause of their problem to be externally 
controllable by another person (see Appendix B), in which case they should 
indicate anger and a desire to retaliate against the other person (e.g., Graham 
et al., 1992). 
Implications for Depressed People 
Neither the responsibility inference process, nor the motivational model 
outlined by Weiner (1986, 1995) have been tested specifically in depressed 
samples. However, a review of relevant depression literature revealed a 
number of leads that make possible several predictions. 
The responsibility inference process 
First, despite a prevailing belief that depressed people have distorted 
cognitions, there is growing evidence to the contrary (e.g., Alloy & Abramson, 
1982, 1979; Dobson & Franche, 1989; Haaga & Beck, 1995). Central to this 
research is the finding that depressed people tend to be less susceptible to 
illusions of control (e.g., Alloy & Abramson, 1982; Layne, 1983), and that an 
illusion of control has been shown to decrease immediate depressive mood 
reactions to negative events (Alloy & Clements, 1992). The "depressive 
realism" findings suggest that depressed people are more likely to view the 
controllability of negative life events as about the same for self and others (i.e., 
to be consistent in their attributions irrespective of the attributional target), 
whereas non-depressed subjects are more likely to view the controllability of 
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negative events happening to self to be lower than the controllability of negative 
events happening to others, i.e., to show a self-serving bias (e.g., Golin, Terrell, 
Weitz, & Drost, 1979). Thus, both in person perception and in self-perception 
domains, depressed and non-depressed people should show distinctive 
attributional patterns, as follows: 
• Pattern A. self-other attributions about the causes of negative 
events/outcomes: 
depressed: high consistency (low control for self and others) 
non-depressed: low consistency (low control for self; high control for others) 
Alternatively, several sources have suggested that depressed and non-
depressed people are likely to differ in their self attributions, but not their 
attributions about others (e.g., Beck, 1976; Sweeney, Shaeffer, & Golin, 1982). 
That is, a "depressive attributional style" is thought to be specific to self 
outcomes because the outcomes and causal explanations have implications for 
self-esteem, whereas others' outcomes and one's causal understanding of 
those should have less impact on self-esteem (cf. Abramson, Seligman, & 
Teasdale, 1978). By this reasoning, an 'illusion of control' bias would be 
operating for non-depressed but not for depressed people which would lead to 
the following attribution predictions: 
• Pattern B. self-other attributions about the causes of negative 
events/outcomes: 
depressed: lower control for self than for others 
non-depressed: higher control for self than for others 
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The responsibility judgement model 
In person perception, if the results of the present study indicated pattern "A" 
above, non-depressed people would have been more likely than depressed 
people to judge victims' personal responsibility for negative events/outcomes to 
be higher and become more angry and neglectful toward victims of negative 
events. If the results indicated pattern "B" above, depressed and non-
depressed individuals would not have differed in their responsibility, affect, or 
action judgments about victims. 
For self perception, if the results indicated pattern "A" above, depressed and 
non-depressed people would not have differed in their responsibility, affect, or 
action judgments. If the results indicated pattern "B" above, non-depressed 
people would have been more likely than depressed people to hold themselves 
responsible for negative outcomes, and become more angry at themselves and 
engaged in behavioral change. 
Self-Other Consistency in Responsibility Judgements 
I was uncertain as to whether people would take greater or lesser 
responsibility for themselves than they assigned to others for the same negative 
outcome. If they took greater responsibility for themselves this would have 
indicated a stronger relative illusion of control over one's own outcomes 
(Langer, 1975). Lesser responsibility for self would have indicated a self-
serving bias was operating (Brown & Rogers, 1991; Krebs, Denton, & Higgins, 
1988; Miller & Ross, 1975). An illusion of control bias (Langer, 1975) refers to 
the people's tendency to attribute more control over positive events for self than 
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they attribute to others' success. Although this bias usually refers to the 
tendency for people to take credit for success and deny responsibility for failure 
(Krebs, Denton, & Higgins, 1 988; Miller & Ross, 1 975), it has been shown that if 
people attribute the cause of their failure as something that is controllable by 
them, they are sometimes willing to accept responsibility for the negative event 
(failure), especially if they believe that they can change future results (cf. 
Weiner et al., 1 972). On the other hand, a self serving bias (Brown & Rogers, 
1991; Krebs, Denton, & Higgins, 1988; Miller & Ross, 1 975), if operating, would 
appear as a tendency for people to attribute the negative outcome to situational 
causes for themselves. This bias is partially due to an actor-observer bias 
effect (Jones & Nisbett, 1971) which predicts that people will attribute the 
negative event for self more to external (or situational) causes and attribute the 
problems of others to their internal traits or dispositions. 
Thesis Research 
I had two aims in the present study. First, I wanted to test the responsibility 
inference process outlined by Weiner (1 995) by manipulating the perceived 
controllability of hypothetical misfortunes. In addition, both depressed and non-
depressed subjects were exposed to the misfortunes, which supposedly 
happened to themselves (self perception) as well as to someone other than 
themselves (person perception). I was interested not only in the validity of the 
responsibility inference process (Weiner, 1 995) and whether it applied to 
depressed people, but also in whether there were systematic differences in the 
self and person perceptions of depressed and non-depressed people. Second, I 
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wanted to test the temporal relations of the emotion mediational model outlined 
by Weiner (1995), for each misfortune, in self and person perception domains, 
and in depressed and non-depressed samples. 
Method 
Participants 
The measures described below were given to 217 undergraduate students 
(127 females, 89 males; mean age= 23.2 years), drawn from introductory 
university courses at the University of Northern British Columbia. The mean 
Beck Depression Inventory (described in the materials section below) scores for 
the 71 individuals in the depressed group and 70 individuals in the non-
depressed group were 18.29 (SD = 6.56) and 2.83 (SD = 1.57), respectively. 
Materials 
Subjects were asked to complete the Beck Depression Inventory (Beck, 
1967) (see Appendix C) as well as a Happiness Measure (Fordyce, 1988) (see 
Appendix E) in an effort to assess their overall state of depression. I originally 
planned to use a combined score of the two scales as an index for classifying 
subjects into depression groups. However, I chose not to use the Happiness 
Measure (Fordyce, 1988). Although the correlation between the two 
questionnaires was significant (I= -.66 , Q = .000), the literature pertaining to 
depressive attributional styles has not included this measurement tool. In an 
effort to make my results comparable with the literature, I chose to use the more 
commonly utilized measure, the Beck Depression Inventory (Beck, 1967). 
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Therefore, details of the Happiness Measure are not provided in the materials 
portion of this paper but appear in Appendix E. 
Subjects also completed two Reasons for Misfortune questionnaires which 
were designed to assess attributions about controllable and uncontrollable 
causes of misfortunes that happened to self and others. The Reasons for 
Misfortune questionnaires measured four empirically-established attributional 
dimensions, namely locus, personal control, external control, and stability 
(Higgins, 1992; McAuley, Duncan, & Russell, 1992; Weiner, 1986). The locus of 
causality refers to whether the cause is within, or external to, the victim (self or 
other). Stability concerns whether the cause is something which is constant or 
changeable over time. Finally, the two control dimensions, personal and 
external control, refer to whether or not the cause is something that is 
controllable by the victim (personal control), or controllable by others (external 
control). 
McAuley et al. (1991) and Higgins (1992) reported positive correlations 
between locus and personal control, and negative correlations between 
personal control and stability as well as locus and external control. Thus, if the 
cause of an event is perceived to be internal to the individual, it is also usually 
perceived to be personally controllable by them; when perceived to be 
personally controllable, it is also usually perceived as being unstable. In 
addition, if a cause is perceived to be internal to an individual, it is also usually 
perceived to be uncontrollable by external factors. McAuley et al. (1991) and 
Higgins (1992) reported negative correlations between personal control and 
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external control. Thus, if a cause is perceived to be personally controllable, it is 
also usually viewed as uncontrollable by external factors. However, Higgins 
(1992), also reported positive correlations between personal control and 
external control for two (of six) misfortunes, which would suggest some 
situational specificity for the correlations between personal control and external 
control subscales. That is, for some of the misfortunes, when a cause was 
viewed as personally uncontrollable, it was also perceived to be uncontrollable 
by others. 
In addition to these four causal dimensions, the questionnaires assessed 
responsibility judgments, emotions, and actions pertaining to each of the 
misfortunes (see Appendix D). 
There were 16 questionnaire packages in total. The orders were 
counterbalanced such that eight of the packages had the Reasons for 
Misfortunes questionnaires first (four with the self version first, and four with the 
person version first) followed by the depression scales (four with the BDI first, 
and four with the Happiness Measure first). The remaining eight packages 
began with the depression scales and ended with the Reasons for Misfortunes 
questionnaires. 
The Beck Depression lnventorv (BDI) 
The BDI (Beck, 1967) consists of 21 questions which assess the intensity of 
depression by examining clinically determined attitudes and symptoms of 
depression (Beck, Steer, & Garbin, 1988). Becket al. (1988) propose that the 
"mean BDI scores for the minimal, mild, moderate, and severe classifications 
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[of depression] are 10.9 (SO= 8.1), 18.7 (SD = 10.2), 25.4 (SO= 9.6), and 30.0 
(SD = 1 0.4), respectively." (Becket al., 1988, p. 79). Based on a review of the 
depressive attributional style literature (Alloy & Abramson, 1979, 1982; Alloy & 
Clements, 1992; Dobson & Franche, 1989; Golin et al., 1979; Haaga & Beck, 
1995; Layne, 1983; , in the present study, the following cut-off scores were used 
to determine depression status: depressed subjects needed to score between 
12 and 63, whereas non-depressed subjects scores needed to be in the 0 to 5 
range. 
Reasons for Misfortune Questionnaires 
These questionnaires each consisted of four negative life outcomes (see 
Appendix D). On each questionnaire, two of the outcomes had controllable 
causes and two had uncontrollable causes. To estimate the degree of self-
other consistency in attributions and judgments, self- and person-perception 
versions of the questionnaire (within subjects) had the same type of cause 
(controllable or uncontrollable) for the outcomes. In addition, the controllability 
of the causes were counterbalanced such that half of the questionnaires gave a 
controllable cause for a specific misfortune and half gave an uncontrollable 
cause. 
Three response categories were considered: (i) cognitions: what the 
individual thought about the cause and about responsibility of the 
outcome/event; (ii) emotions: how the individual felt about the victim (self or 
other), given the cause of the outcome; and (iii) action tendencies: what 
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action(s) the individual would respond with (if any), given the cause of the 
outcome. 
Design and Procedure 
Subjects were tested in classroom groups of 10 to 30 people. The study was 
described as an investigation of people's thoughts about negative and positive 
life outcomes/events. Respondents were asked to read the instructions for each 
questionnaire silently and completely before starting to answer the questions, 
and then to proceed at their own pace. There was no time limit, but most 
subjects completed all the of questionnaires within 30 minutes. 
Dependent variables 
For each negative outcome on the Reasons for Misfortune Questionnaire, 
individuals made 15 judgments, all reported on 9 point rating scales. One 
question assessed perceived responsibility and was anchored such that a high 
score reflected a higher rating of ·responsibility. Two questions assessed each 
of 4 dimensions of perceived causality (locus, personal controllability, external 
controllability, stability), anchored such that high scores represented more 
internal, personally controllable, externally controllable, and stable causes. 
The next 3 questions dealt with individuals' affective reactions to the causes 
of the outcomes. Subjects were asked how angry, sorry, and sad they felt 
about the victim (self or other) given that the negative outcome occurred as a 
result of the cause described. These scales were anchored such that high 
scores reflected more angry, sad, and sorry feelings. 
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Finally, respondents were presented with three behavioral questions. They ~~~·1 
were asked to indicate what they would do (if anything) if the negative outcome 
was a result of the described cause. These questions were anchored such that 
high scores reflected more help, punishment/avoidance, and behavioral 
change. 
Results 
Preliminary analyses of the data showed no effects of stimulus order or age. 
Order and age are therefore ignored in subsequent analyses. Analyses of 
gender effects indicated interactions on some of the variables, but there were 
no systematic differences due to gender. Since the purpose of this thesis was 
to determine whether there are systematic differences for self-other judgements 
as well as between non-depressed and depressed groups, gender will not be 
discussed further. 
It should be noted that the two measures of each of the causal dimensions 
were highly correlated in self and person perception domains for all four 
misfortunes (see Tables 1 - 4). Thus, scores on these measures were 
combined into an average score for each of the causal dimensions (locus, 
stability, personal control, and external control). 
Relationships among the causal dimensions 
For each misfortune, there were significant correlations between locus and 
personal control, and between personal control and stability, in self and person 
perception domains (see Table 5). Thus, when a cause of a misfortune was 
perceived to be internal to the target, it was also perceived to be personally 
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controllable; when perceived to be personally controllable, it was also perceived 
to be unstable. In addition, with the exception of heart disease, for each 
misfortune, there were significant correlations between locus and external 
control (see Table 5). Thus, when a cause of a misfortune was perceived to be 
internal to the target, it was also perceived to be uncontrollable by external 
factors/forces. These patterns of significant correlations among the causal 
dimension scales are consistent with the results of both McAuley et al. (1991) 
and Higgins (1992). 
For two of the misfortunes (AIDS and Paraplegia), there were significant 
negative correlations between personal control and external control (see Table 
5) such that, a cause perceived to be personally controllable was also viewed 
as uncontrollable. by external factors/forces. The negative relationship between 
personal control and external control dimensions is consistent with the findings 
of McAuley et al. (1991) and Higgins (1992), and the misfortune specificity 
replicates findings of Higgins (1992). Also consistent with Higgins (1992), a 
significant positive relationship was found between personal control and 
external control as well as a negative relationship between stability and external 
control for only one of the misfortunes (heart disease) in person perception (see 
Table 5). In other words, if the cause of heart disease was perceived as 
personally uncontrollable, it was also perceived to be uncontrollable by external 
factors (thus, uncontrollable by anyone); in addition, if viewed as stable, then it 
was also perceived to be uncontrollable by external factors/forces. 
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To summarize, in general, theoretically expected correlations among the 
causal dimensions for each of the misfortunes were confirmed. 
Analysis of variables 
To answer the question of whether there were differences attributable to 
depression, target, and/or the causal controllability of the misfortune, variables 
from each response category (responsibility judgements, causal dimension 
ratings, emotions, and action tendency judgements) were analysed separately, 
for each misfortune, in a 2 x 2 x 2 (depression level x causal condition x target) 
analysis of variance with repeated measures on the last factor. 
The criteria for determining effect size (Cohen, 1992; Kirk, 1996), state that, 
for an F-statistic, small, medium, and large effects have values of .01, .059, and 
.138, respectively. For at-test statistic, the values for small, medium, and large 
effects are .10, .24, and .37, respectively. Based on these criteria, the effect 
sizes calculated for the results in this study were, for the most part, large, and 
only a few were medium. There were no small effects. 
Cognitions 
Responsibility. Analysis of the responsibility judgements about the cause of 
a misfortune revealed main effects of causal condition for all four of the 
misfortunes: skin cancer, E(1,134) = 244.98, Q = .000; AIDS, F(1,137) = 681.77, 
Q = .000; heart disease, F(1, 136) = 458.93, Q = .000; and paraplegia, F(1, 137) = 
345.19, Q = .000. Responsibility judgements were higher when the cause given 
was controllable than when it was uncontrollable (see Table 6). 
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In addition, for three of the misfortunes there were main effects of target: skin 
cancer, E(1, 134) = 1 0.25, Q = .002; AIDS, E(1, 137) = 4.48, Q = .036; and heart 
disease, E(1, 136) = 6.94, Q = .01 ). For these misfortunes, respondents held 
themselves more responsible than others (see Table 9). There were no 
depression level effects on responsibility judgements for any of the misfortunes. 
For paraplegia, there was an interaction between target and.causal condition, 
F(1, 137) = 7.91, Q = .006. Post-hoc analysis of the interaction effect indicated 
that when the cause of paraplegia was controllable, respondents held 
themselves more responsible (M = 7.60, SO = 1.97) than others (M = 6.93, SO 
= 2.37), !(57)= 2.81, Q = .007. There was no effect of target when the cause 
was uncontrollable (see Figure 1 ). 
Locus. Analysis of the locus of control ratings revealed main effects of 
causal condition for all four of the misfortunes: skin cancer, F(1, 138) = 77.47, Q 
= .000; AIDS, E(1,137) = 318.26, Q = .000; heart disease, F(1,137) = 214.75, Q 
= .000; and paraplegia, E(1, 138) = 365.69, Q = .000. Respondents made more 
internal attributions when the cause was controllable than when it was 
uncontrollable (see Table 6). 
There were also main effects of target for skin cancer, F(1, 136) = 9.34, Q = 
.000, and heart disease, E(1, 137) = 20.04, Q = .000. For these misfortunes, 
respondents made more internal judgements about the cause for self than for 
others (see Table 9). There were no depression level effects on locus 
judgements for any of the misfortunes. 
Responsibility Judgements About Stigmas 20 
Analysis of the locus judgements for skin cancer showed an interaction 
between target, causal condition, and depression level, E(1, 136) = 4.19, Q = 04. 
Post-hoc analysis of the interaction effect revealed that depressed respondents, 
given a controllable cause, and non-depressed respondents, given an 
uncontrollable cause, made more internal judgements about the cause for self 
(Ms = 6.79 and 4.66, SDs = 1.42 and 1.63, respectively) than for others (Ms = 
6.04 and 4.03, SDs = 1.73 and 1.34, respectively), !(38) = 2.49, Q = .017 and 
!(28) = 2.40, Q = .02, respectively. There were no target effects for the 
remaining two groups (see Figure 2). 
Stability. Analysis of judgements about the stability of a cause showed main 
effects of causal condition for three of the misfortunes: skin cancer, F(1, 138) = 
78.39, Q = .000; AIDS, F(1,137) = 17.51, Q = .000; and heart disease, E(1,137) 
= 66.44, Q = .000. For these misfortunes, respondents viewed an uncontrollable 
cause as more stable than a controllable one (see Table 6). 
There was also a main effect of depression level for heart disease, F(1, 137) 
= 4.45, Q = .036, such that non-depressed respondents (M = 6.22, SO = 2.21) 
viewed the cause as more stable than did depressed respondents (M = 5.43, 
SO = 2.23). There were no main effects of target for the misfortunes. 
For skin cancer, the analysis revealed a target x causal condition x 
depression level interaction, F(1, 136) = 6.31, Q = .013. Post-hoc analysis of the 
interaction effect showed that when the cause of skin cancer was 
uncontrollable, depressed respondents viewed the cause as more stable for 
themselves (M = 7.73, SO= 1.91) than for others (M = 6.55, SO= 1.90), !(29) = 
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3.01, Q = .005. However, non-depressed respondents did not (see Figure 3). In 
addition, when the cause was uncontrollable, depressed respondents viewed 
the cause as more stable for themselves than did non-depressed respondents 
(Ms = 7.73 and 6.38, SDs = 1.90 and 1.73, respectively), !(57)= -2.85, Q = 
.006. This pattern did not occur for judgements about others, or when the 
cause was controllable (see Figure 3). 
There were no effects of causal condition, target, or depression level for 
stability judgements for paraplegia. 
Personal Control. Analysis of the personal control ratings indicated main 
effects of causal condition for all four of the misfortunes: skin cancer, F(1, 138) = 
194.25, Q = .000; AIDS, f(1, 135) = 453.02, Q = .000; heart disease, F(1, 137) = 
129.78, Q = .000; and paraplegia, E(1 ,138) = 284.73, Q = .000. For each 
misfortune, respondents viewed a controllable cause as more personally 
controllable than an uncontrollable cause (see Table 6). 
The only misfortune with a main effect of target was skin cancer, F(1, 138) = 
5.75, Q = .018. For this misfortune, respondents viewed themselves as having 
more personal control over the cause than others (see Table 9). 
Finally, for AIDS, there was also a main effect of depression level, F(1, 135) = 
5.73, Q = .018, such that non-depressed respondents (M = 5.89, SD = 3.12) 
viewed the cause as being more personally controllable than did depressed 
respondents (M = 5.20, SO = 3.09). 
External Control. Analysis of the external control judgements for the causes 
of the misfortunes indicated main effects of causal condition for AIDS, F(1, 137) 
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= 46.64, Q = .000, and paraplegia, E(1, 136) = 64.78, Q = .000. For these two 
misfortunes, respondents viewed the controllable causes as less controllable by 
external factors than the uncontrollable causes (see Table 6). 
There were main effects of target for AIDS, E(1, 137) = 7.22, Q = .008, and 
heart disease, E(1, 138) = 8.92, Q = .003. That is, for these misfortunes, 
respondents viewed the cause as less externally controllable for self than for 
others (see Table 9). 
In addition, there was also a main effect of depression level for paraplegia, 
f(1, 136) = 4.78, Q = .03, such that non-depressed respondents (M = 5.86, SD = 
2.24) viewed the cause as more externally controllable than depressed (M = 
5.12, so= 2.05). 
There were no effects of causal condition, target, or depression level for 
external control ratings for skin cancer. 
Summary 
To summarize, for all of the misfortunes, when the cause of a misfortune was 
controllable, responsibility ratings were higher, the cause was perceived as 
more internal and more personally controllable than when the cause of the 
misfortune was uncontrollable. Additionally, for three of the misfortunes, when 
the cause was uncontrollable, it was perceived to be more stable than when it 
was controllable. Finally, for half of the misfortunes, when the cause was 
controllable, it was viewed as less controllable by external factors than when it 
was uncontrollable. 
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Self-other differences for cognition judgements showed some situational 
specificity. For three of the misfortunes, respondents held themselves more 
responsible than others. For half of the misfortunes, respondents viewed the 
causes as more internal and less controllable by external forces for self than for 
others. There were no self-other differences for judgements about the stability 
of the cause. 
Finally, there were no systematic differences due to depression level for 
cognition judgements. 
Emotion Judgements 
Anger. Analysis of the anger judgements showed main effects of causal 
condition for all four of the misfortunes: skin cancer, E(1, 137) = 278.22, Q = 
.000; AIDS, F{1,137) = 324.12, Q = .000; heart disease, F(1,134) = 327.15, Q = 
.000; and paraplegia, E(1, 136) = 333.55, Q = .000. When the cause of the 
misfortune was controllable, respondents reported stronger feelings of anger 
than when it was uncontrollable (see Table 7). 
In addition, for all of the misfortunes, there were main effects of target: skin 
cancer, F(1, 135) = 113.73, Q = .000; AIDS, F(1, 135) = 93.43, Q = .000; heart 
disease, E(1, 134) = 52.42, Q = .000; and paraplegia, F(1, 136) = 142.48, Q = 
.000. Respondents reported stronger feelings of anger toward themselves than 
toward others (see Table 1 0). 
Analysis of the anger judgements also showed main effects of depression 
level for skin cancer, E(1, 135) = 6.11, Q = .01, and heart disease, F(1, 132) = 
11.70, Q = .001. For these misfortunes, depressed respondents (Ms = 4.71 and 
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4.54, SDs = 2.74 and 2.99, respectively) reported stronger feelings of anger 
than did non-depressed respondents (Ms = 4.04 and 3.47, SDs = 2.55 and 
2.83, respectively). 
There was a target x causal condition interaction for heart disease, E(1, 132) 
= 11.92, Q = .001, and for paraplegia, E(1, 136) = 60.06, Q = .000. Post-hoc 
analyses of the interactions showed that the self-other mean differences were 
higher in the controllable condition (mean differences= 2.46 and 3.95, 
respectively) than in the uncontrollable condition (mean differences = .87 and 
.84, respectively). That is, respondents were more angry at themselves than 
others when the cause was controllable in comparison to anger toward self 
(relative to others) when the cause was uncontrollable (see Figures 4 and 5). 
Finally, there was a target x causal condition x depression level interaction for 
skin cancer, E(1, 135) = 3.91, Q = .05, and for AIDS, F(1, 135) = 8.83, Q = .004. 
Post-hoc analysis of the interaction for skin cancer revealed that when the 
cause was controllable, depressed respondents reported more anger toward 
themselves than non-depressed (Ms = 8.45 and 7.61, SDs = .96 and 1.91, 
respectively) as well as toward others, (Ms = 5.17 and 3. 76, SDs = 2.52 and 
2.68, respectively), !(79) = -2.49, Q = .015 and !(79) = -2.42, Q = .018, 
respectively. When the cause was uncontrollable, there was no interaction 
between target and depression level (see Figure 6). 
For AIDS, the post-hoc analysis showed that when the cause was 
controllable, depressed respondents felt more anger toward others than non-
depressed (Ms = 6.41 and 4.49, SDs = 2.43 and 3.52, respectively) !(80) = -
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2.89, J2 = .005. There was no effect of depression for anger judgements toward 
self, or when the cause was uncontrollable (see Figure 7). 
Sorrv. Analysis of the pity judgements revealed main effects of causal 
condition for three of the misfortunes: AIDS, E(1, 136) = 20.61, J2 = .000; heart 
disease, E(1, 137) = 1 0.25, J2 = .002; and paraplegia, E(1, 137) = 15.00, J2 = .000. 
Respondents felt more sympathy when the cause for a misfortune was 
uncontrollable than when it was controllable (see Table 7). 
For all four of the misfortunes there were main effects of target: skin cancer, 
E(1, 138) = 16.82, J2 = .000; AIDS, f(1, 136) = 1 0.13, J2 = .002; heart disease, 
E(1, 137) = 16.84, J2 = .000; and paraplegia, E(1, 137) = 16.27, J2 = .000. 
Respondents felt more sorry for others' plight than for their own (see Table 1 0). 
In addition, there were main effects of depression level for skin cancer, 
E(1, 136) = 4.81, J2 = .03, and heart disease, F(1, 135) = 4.30, J2 = .04. For these 
misfortunes, depressed respondents (Ms = 6.62 and 6.43, SDs = 2.06 and 2.23, 
respectively) reported stronger feelings of pity than did the non-depressed 
respondents (Ms = 5.96 and 5.69, SDs = 2.09 and 2.16, respectively). 
There were also target x causal condition interactions for all four misfortunes: 
skin cancer, F(1, 136) = 5.45, J2 = .02; AIDS, E(1, 136) = 3.91, J2 = .05; heart 
disease, E(1, 135) = 8.76, J2 = .004; and paraplegia, F(1, 137) = 4.82, J2 = .03. 
Post-hoc analysis for these misfortunes indicated that when the cause of the 
misfortune was uncontrollable, respondents felt more sorry for others (Ms = 
7.54, 8.36, 7.46, and 8.23, SDs = 2.06, 1.26, 2.27, and 1.58, respectively) than 
for themselves (Ms = 5.83, 7.00, 5.66, and 6.72, SDs = 2.82, 2.53, 2.62, and 
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2.51, respectively), !(58)= -5.02, Q = .000; !(59)= -4.57, Q = .000, !(79) = -6.02, 
Q = .000, and !(80) = -5.16, Q = .000, respectively. There were no effects of 
target when the cause was controllable (see Figures 8 - 11 ). 
Sad. Analysis of the sadness judgements for the misfortunes indicated that 
. only the misfortune of AIDS had a main effect of causal condition, F(1, 136) = 
9.87, Q = .002. For AIDS, respondents generally felt more sad when the cause 
was uncontrollable than when it was controllable (see Table 7). 
There were main effects of target for three of the misfortunes: skin cancer, 
E(1, 136) = 4.81, Q = .03; heart disease, F(1, 136) = 15.29, Q = .000; and 
paraplegia, E(1, 136) = 5.42, Q = .02. For these misfortunes, respondents felt 
more sad about others' plight than their own (see Table 10). 
Finally, there were main effects of depression level for skin cancer, F(1, 134) 
= 7.99, Q = .005, and heart disease, F(1, 136) = 5.09, Q = .026. For these two 
misfortunes, depressed respondents (Ms = 7.06 and 6.90, SDs = 1.82 and 
2.13, respectively) generally felt more sad than did non-depressed respondents 
(Ms = 6.25 and 6.07, SDs = 2.11 and 2.22, respectively). 
For paraplegia, there was a target x casual condition interaction, F(1, 136) = 
4.27, Q = .045. Post-hoc analysis of this interaction revealed that when the 
cause of paraplegia was uncontrollable, respondents generally felt more sad 
about others' (M = 7.99, SD = 1.83) plight than their own (M = 7.1 0, SD = 2.30), 
!(80) = -3.55, Q = .001. There was no effect of target when the cause was 
controllable (see Figure 12). 
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For skin cancer, there was an interaction between causal condition and 
depression level, f(1, 134) = 7.18, Q = .008. Post-hoc analysis of this interaction 
indicated that when the cause of skin cancer was uncontrollable, depressed 
subjects (M = 7.85, SD = 1.08) felt more sad than non-depressed subjects (M = 
6.03, SD = 2.31), t(57) = -3.90, p = .000 There was no effect of depression 
level when the cause was controllable (see Figure 13). 
Summary 
In sum, when the cause of a misfortune was controllable, respondents 
reported stronger feelings of anger and, generally, felt less sympathetic than 
when the cause was uncontrollable. There were no systematic differences in 
feelings of sadness due to the controllability of a cause. 
Self-other differences for emotion judgments were consistent. Respondents 
reported stronger feelings of anger, less sympathy, and, generally, less sadness 
for themselves than for others. 
Finally, for half of the misfortunes (skin cancer and heart disease), depressed 
respondents reported stronger feelings of anger, sympathy, and sadness than 
non-depressed respondents. 
Action Judgements 
Help. Analysis of helping judgements for the misfortunes revealed that there 
was a main effect of causal condition only for heart disease, F(1, 137) = 6.18, Q 
= .014. For heart disease, respondents were more likely to help when the 
cause was uncontrollable than when it was controllable (see Table 8). 
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For three of the misfortunes there were main effects of target: skin cancer, 
E(1, 138) = 30.44, Q = .000; AIDS, E(1, 138) = 12.21, Q = .001; and heart 
disease, F(1, 137) = 14.74, Q = .000. For these misfortunes, respondents were 
more likely to do something to help themselves than to help others (see Table 
11 ). There were no main effects of depression level for the misfortunes. 
For heart disease, there was also a target x causal condition interaction 
(E(1 , 137) = 7.33, Q = .008). Post-hoc analysis of this interaction indicated that 
when the cause of heart disease was controllable, respondents would help 
themselves (M = 8.63, SD = 1.23) more than others (M = 7.54, SD = 2.02), 
!(58)= 3.50, Q = .001. There was no effect of target when the cause was 
uncontrollable (see Figure 14). 
Finally, for paraplegia there was a target x depression level interaction, 
F(1, 138) = 7.33, Q = .008. When examined in post-hoc analysis, the interaction 
indicated that non-depressed respondents were more likely to help themselves 
(M = 8.81, SD = .69) than others (M = 8.16, SD = 2.02), !(69) = 4.17, Q = .000. 
There was no effect of target for the depressed group (see Figure 15). 
Avoid/Punish. Analysis of the behavior judgements, to either avoid others or 
to punish oneself, revealed main effects of causal condition for all four 
misfortunes: skin cancer, E(1, 137) = 13.73, Q = .000; AIDS, F(1, 137) = 20.02, Q 
= .000; heart disease, F(1, 137) = 50.02, Q = .000; and paraplegia, F(1, 138) = 
29.44, Q = .000. Respondents indicated that they would be more likely to 
engage in these behaviors when the cause of a misfortune was controllable 
than when it was uncontrollable (see Table 8). 
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The analysis also revealed main effects of target for three misfortunes: skin 
cancer, F(1, 135) = 6.29, Q = .01; heart disease, F(1, 135) = 1 0.24, Q = .002; and 
paraplegia, F(1, 136) = 18.32, Q = .000. For these misfortunes, respondents 
indicated that they were more likely to punish themselves than to avoid others 
(see Table 11 ). 
For all of the misfortunes, there were also main effects of depression level: 
skin cancer, F(1, 135) = 14.69, Q = .000; AIDS, F(1, 131) = 17.23, Q = .000; heart 
disease, f(1, 135) = 11.17, Q = 001; and paraplegia, F(1, 136) = 13.43, Q = .000. 
Depressed respondents (Ms = 2.74, 3.27, 2.85, and 2.71, SDs = 1.62, 2.17, 
2.14, and 1.96, respectively) were more likely to engage in these behaviors than 
non-depressed respondents (Ms = 1.85, 2.14, 2.03, and 1.85, SDs = 1.25, 1.38, 
1.50, and 1.34, respectively). 
There were interactions between target and causal condition for three 
misfortunes: AIDS, E(1, 135) = 7.54, Q = .007; heart disease, E(1.135) = 10.61, Q 
= .001; and paraplegia, F(1, 136) = 20.57, Q = .000. A post-hoc analysis of the 
interactions revealed that when the cause given was controllable, respondents 
were more likely to punish themselves (Ms = 3.81, 4.29, and 3.95, SDs = 3.01, 
2.88, and 2.81, respectively) than to avoid others (Ms = 2.74, 2.86, and 2.31, 
SDs = 2.34, 2.48, and 1.79, respectively), !(80) = 2.62, Q = .01; !(58)= 3.38, Q = 
.001; and !(58)= 4.71, Q = .000, respectively. There were no effects of target 
when the causes were uncontrollable (see Figures 16- 18). 
Higher order interactions of causal condition x depression level were 
revealed in the analysis for heart disease, f(1, 135) = 4.72, Q = .03, and 
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paraplegia, E(1, 136) = 5.50, Q = .02. Post-hoc analysis for these interactions 
indicated that when the cause was controllable, depressed respondents (Ms = 
4.30 and 3.88, SOs = 2.33 and 2.08, respectively) judged that they would be 
more likely to engage in these behaviors than non-depressed respondents (Ms 
= 2.83 and 2.34, SOs = 1.67 and 1.45, respectively), !(57)= -2.79, Q = .007, and 
!(57)= -3.29, Q = .002, respectively. There were no effects of depression level 
when the cause was uncontrollable (see Figures 19 and 20). 
In addition, a target x depression level interaction for paraplegia, F(1, 136) = 
7.96, Q = .006, when examined in post-hoc analysis, indicated that depressed 
subjects are more likely to punish themselves (M = 3.29, SO= 2.81) than to 
avoid others (M = 2.14, SO= 1.91), !(69) = 3.44, Q = .001. There was no effect 
of target for the non-depressed group (see Figure 21). 
Finally, skin cancer was the only misfortune with an interaction between 
target, causal condition, and depression, E(1, 135) = 7.89, Q = .006. Post-hoc 
analysis of this interaction revealed that depressed respondents would punish 
themselves (M = 4.40, SO = 3.1 0) more than they would avoid others (M = 1.88, 
SO = 1 .46) when the cause was controllable, !(39) = 4.58, Q = .000. 
Furthermore, when the cause was uncontrollable, depressed respondents 
indicated that they would punish themselves more (M = 2.27, SO= 2.02) than 
non-depressed respondents (M = 1.21, SO= .56), as well as avoid others more 
than non-depressed respondents would (Ms = 2.13 and 1.36, SOs = 1.61, .68, 
respectively), !(57)= -2.73, Q = .01 and !(56)= -2.36, Q = .02, respectively. 
However, when the cause given was controllable, there was only a depression 
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level effect for the self judgements, such that depressed respondents indicated 
that they would punish themselves more than non-depressed respondents 
would (Ms = 4.40 vs. 2.1 0, SDs = 3.10 and 1.48, respectively), !(79) = -4.29, Q = 
.000 (see Figure 22). 
Change. Analysis of the behavior change judgements revealed main effects 
of causal condition for all four misfortunes: skin cancer, F(1, 138) = 65.44, Q = 
.000; AIDS, F(1, 137) = 71.11, Q = .000; heart disease, F(1, 137) = 22.48, Q = 
.000; and paraplegia, F(1, 137) = 24.55, Q = .000. Change in behavior was more 
likely when the cause of the misfortune was controllable than when it was 
uncontrollable (see Table 8). 
In addition, there were main effects of target for all of the misfortunes: skin 
cancer, F(1, 138) =1 0.76, Q = .001; AIDS, F(1, 135) = 11.01, Q = .000; heart 
disease, f(1, 137) = 5.81, Q = .017; and paraplegia, F(1, 137) = 12.32, Q = .001. 
Respondents were more likely to change their own behavior than advocate that 
others change theirs (see Table 11 ). There were no main effects of depression 
level for any of the misfortunes. 
For AIDS, there was an interaction between target, causal condition and 
depression level, f(1, 135) = 6.74, Q = .011. Post-hoc analysis of this interaction 
effect revealed that non-depressed respondents, given a controllable cause of 
AIDS, and depressed respondents, given an uncontrollable cause, were more 
likely to change their own behavior (Ms = 8.37 and 6.00, SDs = 1.71 and 3.11, 
respectively) than advocate that others change theirs (Ms = 7.56 and 4.03, SDs 
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= 2.16 and 2.81, respectively), !(40) = 2.50, Q = .017 and !(29) = 3.11, Q = .004, 
respectively (see Figure 23). 
Summary 
To summarize, when the cause of a misfortune was controllable, 
respondents reported that they would punish themselves, avoid others, and 
expect a behavioral change more than when the cause was uncontrollable. On 
the other hand, controllability affected helping behavior judgements only for 
heart disease. 
There were systematic self-other differences for action judgements. For the 
majority of the misfortunes, respondents reported that they would help and 
punish themselves more than others. Furthermore, for all of the misfortunes, 
respondents indicated that they would change their own behavior more than 
they would advocate that others change theirs. 
Finally, there were no effects of depression level for helping or behavior 
change judgements. However, overall, depressed respondents indicated that 
they would punish themselves as well as avoid others more than non-
depressed respondents indicated they would. 
Model Testing 
I examined the temporal relations between the variables to determine 
whether the data sets in self and person perception domains for depressed and 
non-depressed respondents were consistent with the motivational model 
outlined by Weiner (1995). I also tested several alternative models. 
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Structural equation modeling (SEM) using the multi-sample procedure of the 
LISREL 8.14 statistical package (Joreskog & Sorbom, 1995) was used to 
address this question. LISREL 8.14 calculates the parameter estimates as well 
as a goodness-of-fit chi-square statistic to determine whether the data are 
consistent with the model being tested. To make a judgement about the fit of a 
model, I considered the chi-square statistic which should not be significant if the 
model fits the data, and the Normed Fit Index (NFI) developed by Bentler & 
Bonett (1980). This fit statistic ranges from 0 (no fit) to 1 (perfect fit}, with 
values greater than .90 representing an acceptable fit. The benefit of using a 
multi-sample approach is that it generates a goodness of fit chi-square that 
simultaneously tests the model in more than one group. Thus, I was able to 
test whether a particular model was the same in both depressed and non-
depressed groups. 
Four models were considered for the SEM tests. Model 0 is a complete 
model with links among all of the variables (see Appendix F). Although it is 
completely saturated and cannot be tested using chi-square procedures, this 
model is useful in comparing the path coefficients to the other models which are 
hierarchically nested versions of the saturated model. Model 1 is an emotion 
mediational model (see Appendix G). As already indicated, this model 
proposes that thoughts determine feelings which, in tum, serve as guides for 
behavior. Model2 is an independent effects model (see Appendix H). It 
proposes that people might experience emotions independent of cognitions and 
that the cognitions and emotions each can directly influence actions, but as 
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separate processes. Finally, Model 3, a cognition mediational model, illustrates 
yet another possible temporal sequence (see Appendix 1). Perhaps emotions 
influence cognitive appraisals, and it is the appraisals that serve to direct 
behavior. 
Person Perception 
I examined the temporal relations between responsibility, pity (sorry), and 
helping behavior judgements (see Tables 12- 15). 
Tables 16 through 19 show, for each misfortune, the parameter estimates of 
each model, expressed as standardized path coefficients, their associated z-
score, and, where applicable, the chi-square and Bentler-Bonnet NFI generated 
to evaluate the fit of the model. The multi-sample procedure revealed 
differences between status groups (depressed and non-depressed) for all four 
misfortunes. Therefore, the results are reported separately for non-depressed 
and depressed respondents. 
Skin Cancer 
Of all the models tested, Model 1 is the only model that can be said to fit the 
data (see Table 16). For the non-depressed group, Model 1 generated a non-
significant chi-square and a relatively high NFI score (x2(1, N = 70) = .11, Q = 
.74, NFI = .99). Similarly, for depressed respondents, Model1 yielded a x2(1, N 
= 70) = .76, Q = .38, NFI = .96. Although both Models 2 and 3 yielded non-
significant chi-squares for at least one of the status groups, the models also 
yielded unacceptable NFI scores for both status groups, and thus provided a 
poor fit to the data. 
Responsibility Judgements About Stigmas 35 
In sum, for the skin cancer data, the emotion mediational model was the only 
one among those tested that accounted for the observed correlations in both 
the non-depressed and depressed groups. 
AIDS 
It is evident from Table 17 that, again, Model1 is the only model that can be 
said to fit the data for AIDS. For the non-depressed group, Model1 generated 
a l(1, N = 70) = .15, Q = .70, NFI = 1.0 (a perfect fit). Similarly, for depressed 
respondents, Model1 yielded a x2(1, N = 70) = .85, Q = .36, NFI = .97. Both 
Models 2 and 3 yielded significant chi-squares and unacceptable NFI scores for 
both status groups indicating a very poor fit to the data. 
In sum, for these data as well as those for Skin Cancer, the emotion 
mediational model was the only one among those tested that accounted for the 
observed correlations in both the non-depressed and depressed groups. 
Heart Disease 
Table 18 shows again that Model 1 is the only model that fit the data. For the 
non-depressed group, Model1 generated a x2(1, N = 70) = 1.61, Q = .20, NFI = 
.94. Similarly, for depressed respondents, Model1 yielded a x2(1, N = 70) = .06, 
Q = .81, NFI = 1.0 (a perfect fit). Both Models 2 and 3 yielded significant chi-
squares and unacceptable NFI scores for both status groups indicating a very 
poor fit to the data. 
In sum, for all three misfortunes discussed thus far, the emotion mediational 
model was the best model among those tested to account for the relations 
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among the variables in both non-depressed and depressed people's reactions 
to the misfortunes of others. 
Paraplegia 
For reactions to others' paraplegia, both Model 1 and Model 3 provided a 
good fit to the data for the non-depressed group (see Table 19). In that group, 
Model 1 generated a l(1, N = 70) = 2.07, Q = .15, NFI = .91, and Model 3 
yielded a l(1, N = 70) = .72, Q = .40, NFI = .97. 
For the depressed group, Model1 did fit better than Model3 (l(1, N = 70) = 
.88, Q = .35, NFI = .98 and :l(1, N = 70) = 16.74, Q = .00, NFI =.55, 
respectively). Model2, on the other hand, did not provide an adequate fit to the 
data for either of the groups. 
In sum, the picture for Paraplegia is not as clear. For depressed 
respondents, the emotion mediational model best accounted for the observed 
correlations. On the other hand, both Models 1 and 3 yielded significant chi-
squares and acceptable NFI's for the non-depressed group's data. However, 
the NFI for the emotion mediational model (.91) and the NFI for the cognition 
mediational model (.97) suggest the latter model fits the non-depressed group's 
data slightly better. 
Self Perception 
Next, I examined the temporal relations between the variables in self 
perception. I was interested in the relations between responsibility, anger, and 
behavior change judgements (see Tables 20- 23). 
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Skin Cancer 
Table 24 shows that of all the models tested, Model1 is the only model that 
can be said to fit the data. For the non-depressed group, Model 1 generated a 
non-significant chi-square and a relatively high NFI score (X2(1, N = 70) = 1.36, 
Q = .24, NFI = .99). Similarly, for depressed respondents, Model1 yielded a 
x2(1, N = 70) = .41, Q = .52, NFI = 1.0 (a perfect fit). Although the NFI scores 
for Model three were acceptable and the chi-squares approached non-
significance, the fit was not as strong as that of Model1 in each of the two 
status groups. Finally, Model2 was a completely unacceptable model for the 
data. 
In sum, for the skin cancer data, the emotion mediational model is the only 
model among those tested which accounted for the observed correlations in 
both non-depressed and depressed respondents. 
AIDS 
Table 25 shows that Model1 is the only model that can be said to fit the 
data. For the non-depressed group, Model 1 generated a x2(1, N = 70) = .30, Q 
= .59, NFI = 1.0 (a perfect fit). Similarly, for depressed respondents, Model 1 
yielded a x2(1, N = 70) = .12, Q = .73, NFI = 1.0 (another perfect fit). Models 2 
and 3 yielded significant chi-squares for both status groups and the small NFI's 
for Model 2 make it a clearly unacceptable model to account for the data. 
Although the NFI's for Model 3 are greater than .90, in combination with the 
significant chi-squares, it was necessary to reject Model 3 as one that accounts 
for the observed correlations. 
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In sum, for AIDS as well as for Skin Cancer, the emotion mediational model 
remains the only one among those tested that accounted for the observed 
correlations in both non-depressed and depressed people. 
Heart Disease 
For reactions to heart disease for self, Model1 and Model3 both provided a 
good fit for the data for the non-depressed group (see Table 26). For that 
group, Model1 generated a l(1, N = 70) = 3.67, Q = .06, NFI = .97 and Model 
3 yielded a x2(1, N = 70) = .09, Q = .76, NFI = 1.0. The significant chi-square 
and unacceptable NFI for Model2 make it an unacceptable model to account 
for the data for non-depressed respondents' data. 
For the depressed group, Model 3 yielded a l(1, N = 70) = .16, Q = .69, NFI 
= 1.0. Models 1 and 2 yielded significant chi-squares for the depressed 
respondents' data, and the NFI for Model 2 was unacceptable. Although the 
NFI for Model1 was acceptable (.90), the significant chi-square makes it 
necessary to reject it as one that accounts for the observed correlations. 
In sum, for Heart Disease, the cognition mediational model provides the best 
fit for the non-depressed respondent's data and is the only model, among those 
tested, which accounted for the observed correlations in the depressed groups' 
data. 
Paraplegia 
It is evident from Table 27 that Model1 fits the data for the depressed group, 
but not as well as Model 3. For the depressed group, Model 1 generated a 
x2(1, N = 70) = 2.47, Q = .12, NFI = .97, whereas Model3 yielded a x2(1, N = 
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70) = .36, Q = .55, NFI = 1.0. For the non-depressed group, Model 1 provided 
the best fit to the data (l(1, N = 70) = .97, Q = .32, NFI = .99). Model 2 did not 
provide an adequate fit for either of the groups. 
In sum, for Paraplegia, for non-depressed data set, the emotion mediational 
model was the best model, among those tested, at accounting for the observed 
correlations. On the other hand, the cognition mediational model was a slightly 
better model in explaining the relationships in the data for the depressed 
respondents. 
Summary 
In person perception, the emotion mediational model was the best among 
those tested at accounting for depressed and non-depressed respondents' 
reactions to others' skin cancer, AIDS, and heart disease. For paraplegia, the 
emotion mediational model provided the best fit for the data for the depressed 
group, but in the non-depressed group, both the cognition mediational model 
and the emotion mediational model provided a good fit to the data. 
In self perception, the emotion mediational model was the best among those 
tested at accounting for depressed and non-depressed respondent's reactions 
to having skin cancer and AIDS. For paraplegia, of the models tested, the 
emotion mediational model provided the best fit for the data for the non-
depressed group. However, the cognition mediational model provided the best 
fit to the data for the depressed group. For heart disease, the cognition 
mediational model provided the best fit to the data for the non-depressed group 
Responsibility Judgements About Stigmas 40 
and was the only model, among those tested, which accounted for the observed 
correlations for the data for the depressed group. 
Discussion 
There were two goals addressed in this thesis. The first was to test the 
responsibility inference process (Weiner, 1995) in self and person perception 
domains, as well as in depressed and non-depressed groups. The results 
obtained in this study supported the predictions outlined by the responsibility 
inference process. 
The second goal was to test the temporal relations outlined in the emotion 
mediational model of social motivation model (Weiner, 1995), for self and 
person perceptions, in each of the misfortunes, as well as for depressed and 
non-depressed samples. In person perception, the results obtained in the model 
testing portion of this study provided strong support for the emotion mediational 
model (Weiner 1986; 1995) for both depressed and non-depressed samples. 
However, in self perception, the results did not provide consistent support for 
the emotion mediational model. 
The Responsibility Inference Process 
The responsibility inference process (Weiner, 1986; 1995) suggests that 
when (i) there is personal causality, (ii) the cause is perceived as controllable, 
and (iii) there are no mitigating circumstances, people tend to hold the victim of 
a negative event/outcome responsible for their plight. By manipulating the 
controllability of the causes of the stigmas used in this study I was able to test 
this assumption. Consistent with Weiner's (1995) predictions, when the cause 
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given for a misfortune was controllable, respondents held the victim (self and 
other) as responsible, judged the cause as internal to, and controllable by, the 
victim, and, generally, less controllable by external factors. Conversely, when 
the cause given was uncontrollable, respondents judged the victim (self or 
other) to be less responsible, judged the cause as less internal to, and less 
controllable by, the victim, and, generally, more controllable by external factors. 
Weiner (1995) also outlined a link between the responsibility inference 
process and affective and behavioral responses; that is, higher judgements of 
responsibility lead to stronger feelings of anger, little sympathy, and negative 
behavior reactions, or little help, for the victim, whereas low responsibility 
judgements lead to little anger, high sympathy, low negative behavior reactions, 
and higher helping behavior. These predictions were supported in this study. 
When the cause of a stigma was controllable, in addition to responsibility 
judgements being higher, respondents reported stronger feelings of anger, less 
sympathy, and indicated that they would punish themselves and avoid others. 
Conversely, when the cause of a stigma was uncontrollable, in addition to low 
responsibility judgements, respondents reported less anger, more sympathy, 
and were less inclined to engage in negative behaviors toward the victim (self or 
other). 
Self-Other differences 
The self-other differences observed in this study indicate that an illusion of 
control bias may be operating (Langer, 1975). Respondents not only held 
themselves more responsible than others; they also indicated that they would 
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change their behavior more often than they expected others to change theirs. 
In addition, regardless of the controllability of the cause of a misfortune, 
respondents indicated that they would do something to help themselves in 
relation to these misfortunes, more than to help others. The self-other 
differences in affective responses to the misfortunes may help explain this 
phenomenon. Respondents reported strong feelings of anger toward 
themselves relative to others, irrespective of the controllability of the cause. 
Self-directed anger (guilt) is a strong, motivating emotion which, by its very 
nature, compels an individual to alleviate the stress brought on by feeling angry 
(Cialdini, Kendrick, & Bauman, 1982; Weiner 1992). By helping oneself, or by 
changing one's behavior, it is more probable that these feelings will be 
alleviated. 
Conversely, feelings of pity, or sympathy, have been linked to uncontrollable 
causes of a negative event (Graham et al., 1993; Weiner et al., 1982; Weiner 
et al., 1988). It seems that when people perceive the cause of a negative event 
as uncontrollable, they feel more sorry for themselves and generally, do not 
tend to engage in behaviors which assist in changing their situation. That is, 
pity follows the perception of low personal control over a negative event, 
whereas anger results when the cause is judged to be personally controllable. 
The results of this study support the suggestion that pity is a less motivating 
emotion than anger, due to perceptions of controllability. When the cause of a 
misfortune was controllable, respondents felt little sympathy for the victim (self 
and other). However, when the cause was uncontrollable, respondents 
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reported higher feelings of pity for others than for themselves. Thus, consistent 
with the illusion of control bias (Langer, 1975), it would appear that respondents 
viewed themselves as less deserving of sympathy for their plight, which may 
have resulted in higher action tendencies for self than for other. Overall, it 
seems that respondents perceived themselves as more in control of, and more 
capable of action toward their own problems than were others. 
Depression 
There were no systematic differences between depressed and non-
depressed groups for cognition judgements. Thus, it appears that the 
responsibility inference process operates irrespective of mild depressive states. 
There were depression-level differences for affective responses to skin cancer 
and heart disease, which suggests that there may be some situational 
specificity for the effects of depression on emotions. For skin cancer and heart 
disease, depressed respondents reported stronger feelings of anger, sympathy, 
and sadness, relative to non-depressed respondents, irrespective of the 
controllability of the cause of the misfortune. However, depression level did not 
influence affective reactions to AIDS or paraplegia. 
There was a difference between depressed and non-depressed respondents 
for the negative behavior reactions of either punishing oneself or avoiding 
others. Again, irrespective of the controllability of a cause, depressed 
respondents indicated that they were more likely to engage in these behaviors 
than non-depressed. 
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Based on previous research, I earlier made two predictions regarding the 
differences between depressed and non-depressed samples reactions to the 
causes of negative outcomes. Pattern A, from the depressive realism literature, 
suggested that depressed respondents would show high consistency (i.e., low 
control for self and others) whereas non-depressed respondents would show 
low consistency (i.e., low control for self and high control for others) in their 
judgements about the causes of misfortunes. Pattern B, from the learned 
helplessness literature, indicated that depressed respondents would attribute 
lower control for self than for others whereas non-depressed respondents would 
attribute higher control for self than for others for the cause of a misfortune. 
Based on the results of this study, neither of these patterns of prediction were 
supported. 
The Responsibility Judgement Model 
As stated previously, the results of the model testing lend support to the 
emotion mediational model outlined by Weiner (1995) in person perception. In 
person perception, there were no systematic differences between the 
depression groups which would suggest that the motivational model applies as 
well to mildly depressed populations as to non-depressed populations. For self 
perception, support was provided for both the emotion mediational model and 
the cognition mediational model. There were no systematic differences 
between the depression groups which suggests that the fit of the models was 
not influenced by depression level. 
-
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Person perception 
The emotion mediational model fit the data sets for depressed and non-
depressed samples for most of the misfortunes. However, for paraplegia, the 
non-depressed data set was slightly better explained by the cognition 
mediational model. Given that in this study, there were no differences for 
cognition or sympathy judgements attributable to depression status for the 
misfortune of paraplegia, it is puzzling that the emotion mediational model 
provided the best fit for the depressed sample, and not for the non-depressed. 
Self perception 
In the self perception domain, the emotion mediational model provided the 
best explanation for depressed and non-depressed respondent•s-reactions to 
having skin cancer and AIDS whereas the cognition mediational model best 
explains reactions to heart disease. However, for paraplegia, the results 
provided mixed support for these models. 
The emotion mediational model provided the best fit for the non-depressed 
group data sets for the misfortunes of skin cancer, AIDS, and paraplegia. For 
heart disease, the non-depressed data set was best explained by the cognition 
mediational model. 
For the depressed data sets, the emotion mediational model provided the 
best fit for the data sets for skin cancer and AIDS. For paraplegia, although the 
emotion mediational model and the cognition mediational model provided fits for 
the depressed data, the cognition mediational model provided a slightly better 
fit for the data. Finally, for heart disease, the cognition mediational model was 
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the only model among those tested which accounted for the data set for the 
depressed group. 
The results from the analysis of the responsibility inference process portion 
of this study did not support the differences in the model testing between 
depression groups. For heart disease and paraplegia there were no 
responsibility or behavior change differences attributable to depression level in 
the analysis of variance, nor were there differences attributable to depression 
level for anger judgements for paraplegia. Furthermore, although there were 
differences in anger judgements attributable to depression level for heart 
disease, this difference was such that depressed respondents reported more 
anger than non-depressed respondents. The difference in anger does not 
explain why the cognition mediational model provided a better fit than the 
emotion mediational model. 
This may be a consequence of having used a university population sample 
rather than a clinical population, or, it may be that when the information 
presented to depressed people is not ambiguous, the depressive attributional 
biases previously supported, did not operate. 
Conclusions 
In sum, the results of this study support the predictions of the responsibility 
inferences process and the linkages between cognitions, emotions and action 
tendencies in the motivational model outlined by Weiner (1995) in person 
perception. However, the emotion mediational model (Weiner, 1995) was not 
as strongly supported in self perception. The observed self-other differences 
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suggest that an illusion of control bias is operating in people's judgements about 
stigmas. That is, people viewed themselves as having more control over not 
only the cause of their misfortune, but also in taking action as a result of having 
the misfortune. Finally, the lack of difference between depressed and non-
depressed samples does not support either the predictions made by the 
depressive realism, or the learned helplessness (depressive attributional style) 
literature. 
Limitations of the Study 
If this study were to be conducted in the future, a completely between 
subjects design rather than a mixed design should be used. Using a completely 
between subjects design, in addition to examining whether there are differences 
attributable to groups, target, and/or causal controllability, would make 
examining differences between the misfortunes themselves more simple. 
Additionally, random assignment of the questionnaires, misfortunes, and 
causal conditions of the stigmas rather than controlling for order effects by a 
counterbalancing method would reduce the number of questionnaires that 
would need to be administered. Consequently, the required cell sizes for 
analysis of order effects would be reduced and less time would need to be 
spent collecting data. 
With regard to the Reasons For Misfortune Questionnaires, the emotion 
judgement of sadness could be eliminated. As mentioned earlier, anger and 
sympathy are motivating emotions and seem to predict action judgements well 
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whereas feelings of sadness are related to helping behavior judgements but are 
not consistently related to other action judgements. 
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Table 1 
lntercorrelations Bet ---- - - -- - ----- - - -- - -
Scales 1 
1. Responsibility 1.00 
2. Locus 
3. Stability 
4. Personal control 







1 . Responsibility 1.00 
2. Locus 
3. Stability 
4. Personal control 







Scales for Self and P ~ -- -
Cognition 
2 3 4 
.66 -.49 .77 
1.00 -.30 .56 
1.00 -.58 
1.00 
.63 -.51 .79 
1.00 -.35 .60 
1.00 -.60 
1.00 
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p tion for Skin C - ---- - -
Emotion Judgements Action Judgements 
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Self-perception (n = 214) 
-.10 .77 -.05 -.06 -.08 .32 .46 
-.23 .57 .06 .06 -.05 .21 .28 
.04 -.51 .04 .04 -.06 -.14 -.40 
-.05 .73 -.07 -.06 -.05 .34 .46 
1.00 -.06 -.08 -.11 -.16 -.02 .00 
1.00 .10 .11 -.05 .41 .51 
1.00 .72 .16 .12 .00 
1.00 .21 .08 .04 
1.00 -.24 .22 
1.00 .18 
1.00 
Person-perception (n = 214) 
-.13 .48 -.31 -.26 -.19 .11 .48 
-.18 .29 -.16 -.15 -.01 .04 .33 
.11 -.24 .12 .17 .17 -.05 -.32 
-.12 .46 -.26 -.23 -.13 .07 .45 
1.00 .04 -.01 .05 -.03 .11 -.02 
1.00 -.25 .01 .00 .20 .40 
1.00 .66. .32 -.10 -.13 
1.00 .52 -.18 -.10 






1 . Responsibility 
2. Locus 
3. Stability 
4. Personal control 






11 . Change 
1 . Responsibility 
2. Locus 
3. Stability 
4. Personal control 










Scales for Self and P 
Cognition 
2 3 4 
.81 -.31 .87 
1.00 -.25 .79 
1.00 -.35 
1.00 
.79 -.24 .79 
1.00 -.21 .79 
1.00 -.35 
1.00 
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p for AIDS 
Emotion Judgements Action Judgements 
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Self-perception (n = 214) 
-.49 .85 -.13 -.14 -.06 .42 .50 
-.54 .76 -.10 -.14 -.12 .37 .43 
.13 -.30 .08 .08 -.16 -.11 -.29 
-.47 .82 -.16 -.13 .01 .37 .50 
1.00 -.43 .05 .10 .09 -.19 -.24 
1.00 -.09 -.05 -.04 .48 .57 
1.00 .74 .17 .04 .02 
1.00 .27 -.03 .11 
1.00 -.23 .28 
1.00 .23 
1.00 
Person-perception (n = 214) 
-.42 .61 -.38 -.30 -.24 .19 .51 
-.45 .53 -.34 -.29 -.22 .12 .50 
.07 -.09 .14 .06 .19 -.05 -.21 
-.37 .51 -.32 -.22 -.19 .12 .53 
1.00 -.33 .15 .14 -.02 -.01 -.29 
1.00 -.29 -.10 -.07 .12 .42 
1.00 .69 .37 -.16 -.15 
1.00 .41 -.22 -.10 




lntercorrelations Bet Scales for Self and P -- --- - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - --- - - - -
Cognition 
Scales 1 2 3 4 
1. Responsibility 1.00 .76 -.56 .78 
2. Locus 1.00 -.42 .71 
3. Stability 1.00 -.55 
4. Personal control 1.00 







1 . Responsibility 1.00 .81 -.60 .78 
2. Locus 1.00 -.51 .69 
3. Stability 1.00 -.62 
4. Personal control 1.00 
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p tion for Heart o· - - - - - --- - - - - - - - - -
Emotion Judgements Action Judgements 
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Self-perception (n = 214) 
.08 .83 -.16 -.11 .03 .51 .46 
-.09 .67 -.07 -.05 .10 .41 .42 
-.08 -.52 .07 .08 .05 -.31 -.30 
.12 .66 -.14 -.10 .10 -40 .49 
1.00 .07 -.06 -.03 -.02 .17 .02 
1.00 .02 .07 .02 .62 .44 
1.00 .78 .17 .16 .04 
1.00 .24 .13 .01 
1.00 -.11 .19 
1.00 .28 
1.00 
Person-perception (n = 214) 
.20 .72 -.43 -.27 -.19 .21 .38 
.03 .61 -.37 -.24 -.13 .18 .34 
-.22 -.47 .21 .07 .09 -.18 -.26 
.28 .55 -.37 -.20 -.16 .19 .45 
1.00 .18 -.15 -.16 -.11 .33 .11 
1.00 -.30 -.14 -.07 .20 .36 
1.00 .74 .31 -.13 -.15 
1.00 .42 -.05 -.04 






1 . Responsibility 
2. Locus 
3. Stability 
4. Personal control 







1 . Responsibility 
2. Locus 
3. Stability 
4. Personal control 
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Scales for Self and P p ,tion for P - - - . - - - - - -- - ~ - -- - --- --.- I . 
Cognition Emotion Judgements Action Judgements 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
--- ------ --
Self-perception (n = 214) 
.82 -.14 .86 -.51 .85 -.27 -.17 .00 .47 .40 
1.00 -.05 .78 -.61 .80 -.15 -.07 .00 .46 .42 
1.00 -.22 -.06 -.12 -.05 .00 .00 -.10 .08 
1.00 -.52 .81 -.25 -.13 .04 .43 .44 
1.00 -.54 .11 .06 -.02 -.18 -.26 
1.00 -.17 -.07 -.06 .57 .45 
1.00 .72 .15 -.07 -.02 
1.00 .25 -.04 .10 
1.00 -.27 .08 
1.00 .35 
1.00 
Person-perception (n = 214) 
.83 -.11 .83 -.50 .53 -.43 -.27 -.21 .17 .37 
1.00 -.11 .82 -.55 .52 -.37 -.19 -.17 .21 .44 
1.00 -.17 .01 .06 .08 .03 .20 -.09 .06 
1.00 -.48 .57 -.42 -.23 -.25 .19 .43 
1.00 -.20 .23 .17 .16 -.16 -.27 
1.00 -.21 -.11 -.12 .20 .33 
1.00 .66 .34 -.10 -.14 
1.00 .33 -.16 -.12 
1.00 -.32 -.06 
1.00 .17 
1.00 
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Table 5 
lntercorrelations (Pearson's r) Among Causal Dimensions for Skin Cancer, AIDS, Heart Disease, and Paraplegia by 
Target. 
Skin Cancer AIDS Heart Disease Paraplegia 
Self Person Self Person Self Person Self Person 
Locus - Personal Control .56** .60** .79** .79** .71** .69** .78** .82** 
Personal Control - Stability -.58** -.60** -.35** -.35** -.55** -.62** -.22** -.17* 
Locus - External Control -.23** -.18* -.54** -.45** -.09 .03 -.61 ** -.55** 
Personal Control - External -.05 -.13 -.47** -.37** .12 .28** -.52** -.48** 
Control 
Stability - External Control .04 .11 .13 .07 -.08 -.22** -.06 .01 
* p ~ .01 ** p ~ .001 
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Table 6 
Means and Standard Deviations for Cognition Judgements by Causal Condition for all Four Misfortunes 
Skin Cancer AIDS Heart Disease Paraplegia 
Measure Control Uncontrol Control Uncontrol Control Uncontrol Control Uncontrol 
Responsibility 
M 6.89*** 2.03 7.85*** 1.62 8.43*** 2.32 7.44*** 1.68 
so 1.70 1.94 1.52 1.34 0.90 1.84 1.82 1.37 
Locus 
M 6.59*** 4.31 7.09*** 2.69 7.88*** 4.28 6.68*** 2.10 
so 1.38 1.91 1.42 1.77 1.08 1.69 1.40 1.51 
Stability 
M 4.21 *** 7.13 4.90*** 6.67 4.25*** 7.04 4.76 5.44 
so 1.93 1.53 2.66 2.29 2.14 1.69 2.18 2.30 
Personal Control 
M 7.38*** 3.04 7.85*** 2.34 7.87*** 3.68 7.64*** 2.43 
so 1.52 1.98 1.42 1.66 1.38 2.30 1.44 1.63 
External Control 
M 3.08 3.66 4.04*** 6.80 3.72 3.14 4.06*** 6.67 
so 1.59 2.19 2.21 2.27 1.97 1.59 1.85 1.84 
* p ::;;; .05 ** p ::;;; .01 *** p ::;;; .001 
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Table 7 
Means and Standard Deviations for Emotion Judgements by Causal Condition for all Four Misfortunes 
Skin Cancer AIDS Heart Disease Paraplegia 
Measure Control Uncontrol Control Uncontrol Control Uncontrol Control Uncontrol 
Anger 
M 6.15*** 1.89 7.07*** 1.92 6.84*** 1.81 6.29*** 1.64 
so 1.64 1.37 1.62 1.55 1.91 1.32 1.79 1.12 
Sorry 
M 5.98 6.66 6.28*** 7.48 5.30** 6.66 6.18*** 7.61 
so 2.02 2.04 2.11 1.94 2.39 2.01 2.17 1.57 
Sad 
M 6.59 6.90 6.92** 7.73 6.10 6.78 6.94 7.68 
so 1.95 2.00 2.09 1.88 2.28 2.13 1.96 1.72 
* p s .05 ** p s .01 *** p s .001 
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Table 8 
Means and Standard Deviations for Action Judgements by Causal Condition for all Four Misfortunes 
Skin Cancer AIDS Heart Disease Paraplegia 
Measure Control Uncontrol Control Uncontrol Control Uncontrol Control Uncontrol 
Help 
M 8.05 8.36 8.14 8.51 8.17* 8.47 8.21 8.56 
so 1.31 1.02 1.24 0.92 1.16 0.93 1.14 0.81 
Avoid/Punish 
M 2.61 *** 1.71 3.39*** 1.88 3.34*** 1.58 3.1 0*** 1.55 
so 1.57 1.13 1.95 1.41 2.02 1.06 1.81 1.09 
Change 
M 7.62*** 4.92 8.02*** 4.89 8.00*** 5.89 6.79*** 4.46 
so 1.70 2.53 1.58 2.80 1.34 2.77 1.84 2.66 
* p ~ .05 ** p ~ .01 *** p ~ .001 
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Table 9 
Means and Standard Deviations for Cognition Judgements by Target for all Four Misfortunes 
Skin Cancer AIDS Heart Disease Paraplegia 
Measure Self Other Self Other Self Other Self Other 
Responsibility 
M 5.19** 4.60 5.49* 5.11 5.05** 4.69 4.14 4.00 
so 3.27 3.03 3.61 3.52 3.40 3.41 3.40 3.28 
Locus 
M 5.86*** 5.41 5.32 5.18 6.02*** 5.49 4.03 4.04 
so 2.11 2.07 2.84 2.85 2.45 2.40 2.83 2.86 
Stability 
M 5.34 5.46 5.59 5.73 5.81 5.81 5.26 5.26 
so 2.58 2.32 2.85 2.89 2.49 2.32 2.45 2.51 
Personal Control 
M 5.86* 5.51 5.70 5.40 5.57 5.32 4.68 4.51 
so 2.84 2.87 3.32 3.24 2.92 2.89 3.06 3.08 
External Control 
M 3.30 3.42 4.94** 5.42 3.24** 3.78 5.35 5.65 
so 2.14 2.08 2.90 2.75 1.92 2.02 2.54 2.31 
* p :::; .05 ** p :::; .01 *** p :::; .001 
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Table 10 
Means and Standard Deviations for Emotion Judgements by Target for all Four Misfortunes 
Skin Cancer AIDS Heart Disease Paraplegia 
Measure Self Other Self Other Self Other Self Other 
Anger 
M 5.69*** 3.11 6.12*** 3.70 4.74*** 3.22 4.74*** 2.56 
SD 3.32 2.69 3.47 3.26 3.52 2.96 3.45 2.50 
Sorry . 
M 5.79*** 6.77 6.46** 7.11 5.50*** 6.63 6.47*** 7.51 
SD 2.78 2.45 2.78 2.46 2.74 2.64 2.57 2.06 
Sad 
M 6.32* 6.99 7.09 7.24 6.04*** 6.96 7.04* 7.62 
SD 2.68 2.31 2.49 2.43 2.66 2.51 2.31 1.96 
* p ~ .05 ** p ~ .01 *** p ~ .001 
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Table 11 
Means and Standard Deviations for Action Judgements by Target for all Four Misfortunes 
Skin Cancer AIDS Heart Disease Paraplegia 
Measure Self Other Self Other Self Other Self Other 
Help 
M 8.57*** 7.73 8.58*** 7.92 8.62*** 8.05 8.51 8.26 
so 1.35 1.75 1.54 1.69 1.21 1.61 1.43 1.28 
Avoid/Punish 
M 2.61** 1.98 2.94 2.45 2.73** 2.14 2.61 *** ' 1.94 
so 2.38 1.70 2.77 2.16 2.50 2.09 2.42 1.71 
Change 
M 6.69*** 5.94 7.01 *** 6.27 7.16* 6.66 5.86*** 5.04 
so 2.79 2.91 2.93 2.94 2.69 2.63 3.02 2.95 
* p ~ .05 ** p ~ .01 *** p ~ .001 
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Table 12 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations Among Responsibility, Emotion, 
and Action Tendency in Person Perception by Group for Skin Cancer 
Group 
Measure Non-Depressed Depressed 
Responsibility 
M 4.81 4.40 
SD 3.03 3.04 
Pity 
M 6.54 7.00 
SD 2.53 2.36 
Help 
M 7.80 7.65 
SD 1.63 1.86 
Responsibility X Pity -.20 -.42*** 
Responsibility X Help -.10 -.21 
Pity X Help .30* .28* 
* p $ .05 **p $ .01 ***p $ .001 
Table 13 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations Among Responsibility, Emotion, 
and Action Tendency in Person Perception by Group for AIDS 
Group 
Measure Non-Depressed Depressed 
Responsibility 
M 5.29 4.94 
SD 3.56 3.51 
Pity 
M 6.90 7.33 
SD 2.53 2.39 
Help 
M 8.01 7.83 
SD 1.69 1.70 
Responsibility X Pity -.45*** -.40*** 
Responsibility X Help -.17 -.26* 
Pity X Help .46*** .42*** 
* p $ .01 ** p $ .001 
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Table 14 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations Among Responsibility, Emotion, 
and Action Tendency in Person Perception by Group for Heart Disease 
Group 
Measure Non-Depressed Depressed 
Responsibility 
M 4.59 4.77 
so 3.41 3.44 
Pity 
M 6.42 6.83 
so 2.68 2.60 
Help 
M 8.04 8.06 
so 1.63 1.60 
Responsibility X Pity -.45*** -.35** 
Responsibility X Help -.30** -.12 
Pity X Help .39*** .41 *** 
* p ~ .01 ** p ~ .001 
Table 15 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations Among Responsibility, Emotion, 
and Action Tendency in Person Perception by Group for Paraplegia 
Group 
Measure Non-Depressed Depressed 
Responsibility 
M 3.84 4.15 
so 3.36 3.21 
Pity 
M 7.40 7.63 
so 2.11 2.02 
Help 
M 8.16 8.35 
so 1.37 1.18 
Responsibility X Pity -.48*** -.49*** 
Responsibility X Help -.25* -.14 
Pity X Help .21 .47*** 
. * p ~ .01 ** p ~ .001 
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Table 16 
Person Percee_tion: Parameter Estimates and Goodness of Fit of Four Structural Models by_ Status Graue for Skin Cancer 
Status Group 
Non-Depressed Depressed 
Parameter Path z ·l p NFI Path z l p NFI 
Model 0 (saturated model) 
81: Path from responsibility to pity - .16 - 1.65 -.32 -3.76 
8 2: Path from pity to help .19 2.47 .18 1.83 
83: Path from responsibility to help -.02 -0.33 .07 -0.87 
Model 1 (emotion mediational model) 0.11 .74 .99 .76 .38 .96 
81: Path from responsibility to pity - .16 -1.65 -.32 -3.76 
8 2: Path from pity to help .19 2.58 .22 2.40 
Model 2 (independent effects) 2.70 .10 .71 13.04 .00 .33 
81: Path from responsibility to help -.02 -0.34 -.07 -0.95 
8 2: Path from pity to help .19 2.52 .18 2.01 
Model 3 (cognition mediational model) 5.93 .02 .36 3.33 .07 .83 
81: Path from pity to responsibility -.23 -1.65 -.53 -3.76 
8 2: Path from responsibility to help -.05 -0.80 -.13 -1.74 
Note: A z score greater than 1.96 indicates a significant path. For all chi-square tests, df = 1, N = 70. NFI = Bentler-
8onett Normed Fit Index. 
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Table 17 
Person Perceetion: Parameter Estimates and Goodness of Fit of Four Structural Models by_ Status Groue for AIDS 
Status Group 
Non-Depressed Depressed 
Parameter Path z x2 p NFI Path z x2 p NFI 
Model 0 (saturated model) 
81: Path from responsibility to pity -.32 -4.16 -.27 -3.64 
82: Path from pity to help .32 3.97 .27 3.18 
83: Path from responsibility to help .02 0.38 -.05 -0.92 
Model 1 (emotion mediational model) .15 .70 1.0 .85 .36 .97 
81: Path from responsibility to pity -.32 -4.16 -.27 -3.64 
82: Path from pity to help .31 4.25 .30 3.86 
Model 2 (independent effects) 15.68 .00 .51 12.28 .00 .54 
81: Path from responsibility to help .02 0.43 -.05 -1.0 
82: Path from pity to help .32 4.44 .27 3.48 
Model 3 (cognition mediational model) 14.35 .00 .55 9.58 .00 .64 
81: Path from pity to responsibility -.63 -4.16 -.59 -3.64 
82: Path from responsibility to help -.08 -1.42 -.13 -2.25 
Note: A z score greater than 1.96 indicates a significant path. For all chi-square tests, df = 1, N = 70. NFI = Bentler-
Bonett Normed Fit Index. 
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Table 18 




Parameter Path z l p NFI Path z x2 p NFI 
Model 0 {saturated model) 
8 1: Path from responsibility to pity -.36 -4.18 -.26 -3.07 
82: Path from pity to help .19 2.57 .26 3.52 
83: Path from responsibility to help -.08 -1.27 .01 0.24 
Model 1 {emotion mediational model) 1.61 .20 .94 .059 .81 1.0 
8 1: Path from responsibility to pity -.36 -4.18 -.26 -3.07 
8 2: Path from pity to help .24 3.48 .25 3.67 
Model 2 {independent effects) 15.8 .00 .45 8.96 .00 .58 
8 1: Path from responsibility to help -.08 -1.42 .01 0.26 
8 2: Path from pity to help .19 2.88 .26 3.76 
Model 3 {cognition mediational model) 6.40 .01 .78 11.58 .00 .46 
8 1: Path from pity to responsibility -.58 -4.18 -.46 -3.07 
8 2: Path from responsibility to help -.14 -2.60 -.05 -0.97 
Note: A z score greater than 1.96 indicates a significant path. For all chi-square tests, df = 1, N = 70. NFI = Bentler-
Bonett Normed Fit Index. 
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Table 19 
Person Percee_tion: Parameter Estimates and Goodness of Fit of Four Structural Models by_ Status Groue_ for Parae_leg_ia 
Status Group 
Non-Depressed Depressed 
Parameter Path z x2 p NFI Path z l p NFI 
Model 0 (saturated model) 
8 1: Path from responsibility to pity -.31 -4.67 -.31 -4.60 
82: Path from pity to help .07 0.85 .31 4.32 
83: Path from responsibility to help -.08 -1.44 .04 0.94 
Model 1 (emotion mediational model) 2.07 .15 .91 .88 .35 .98 
8 1: Path from responsibility to pity -.31 -4.67 -.31 -4.60 
8 2: Path from pity to help .14 1.76 .27 4.40 
Model 2 (independent effects) 19.2 .00 .21 18.72 .00 .49 
8 1: Path from responsibility to help -.08 -1.65 .04 1.07 
8 2: Path from pity to help .07 0.97 .31 4.95 
Model 3 (cognition mediational model) .72 .40 .97 16.74 .00 .55 
8 1: Path from pity to responsibility -.78 -4.67 -.77 -4.60 
8 2: Path from responsibility to help -.10 -2.12 -.05 -1.19 
Note: A z score greater than 1.96 indicates a significant path. For all chi-square tests, df = 1, N = 70. NFI = Bentler-
Bonett Normed Fit Index. 
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Table 20 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations Among Responsibility, Emotion, 
and Action Tendency in Self Perception by Group for Skin Cancer 
Group 
Measure Non-Depressed Depressed 
Responsibility 
M 5.53 4.86 
SD 3.18 3.34 
Anger 
M 5.31 6.06 
SD 3.31 3.32 
Change 
M .6.56 6.83 
SD 2.88 2.70 
Responsibility X Anger .81** .81** 
Responsibility X Change .48** .42** 
Anger X Change .51** .48** 
* p ~ .01 ** p ~ .001 
Table 21 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations Among Responsibility, Emotion, 
and Action Tendency in Self Perception by Group for AIDS 
Group 
Measure Non-Depressed Depressed 
Responsibility 
M 5.51 5.47 
SD 3.59 3.66 
Anger 
M 6.10 6.14 
SD 3.44 3.54 
Change 
M 6.84 7.19 
SD 3.07 2.79 
Responsibility X Anger .87** .87** 
Responsibility X Change .57** .37** 
Anger X Change .63** .45** 
* p ~ .01 ** p ~ .001 
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Table 22 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations Among Responsibility, Emotion, 
and Action Tendency in Self Perception by Group for Heart Disease 
Group 
Measure Non-Depressed Depressed 
Responsibility 
M 4.93 5.17 
so 3.37 3.45 
Anger 
M 4.16 5.31 
so 3.37 3.59 
Change 
M 7.09 7.23 
so 2.74 2.65 
Responsibility X Anger .87** .80** 
Responsibility X Change .47** .49** 
Anger X Change .42** .37* 
* p ~ .01 ** p ~ .001 
Table 23 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations Among Responsibility, Emotion, 
and Action Tendency in Self Perception by Group for Paraplegia 
Group 
Measure Non-Depressed Depressed 
Responsibility 
M 4.11 4.16 
so 3.51 3.32 
Anger 
M 4.59 4.89 
so 3.45 3.47 
Change 
M 5.46 6.27 
so 3.09 2.91 
Responsibility X Anger .87** .82** 
Responsibility X Change .38** .40** 
Anger X Change .50** .37* 
* p ~ .01 ** p ~ .001 
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Table 24 
Self Percee_tion: Parameter Estimates and Goodness of Fit of Four Structural Models by_ Status Groue. for Skin Cancer 
Status Group 
Non-Depressed Depressed 
Parameter Path z l p NFI Path z -l p NFI 
Model 0 (saturated model) 
8 1: Path from responsibility to anger .84 11.31 .80 11.32 
82: Path from anger to change .30 1.97 .31 2.12 
8 3: Path from responsibility to change .18 1.16 .09 0.64 
Model 1 (emotion mediational model) 1.36 .24 .99 .41 .52 1.0 
8 1: Path from responsibility to anger .84 11.31 .80 11.32 
82: Path from anger to change .44 4.89 .39 4.47 
Model 2 (independent effects) 73 .00 .23 73.07 .00 .20 
8 1: Path from responsibility to change .18 1.97 .09 1.08 
82: Path from anger to change .30 3.35 .31 3.61 
Model 3 (cognition mediational model) 3.84 .05 .96 4.43 .04 .95 
8 1: Path from anger to responsibility .78 11.31 .81 11.32 
82: Path from responsibility to change .44 4.55 .34 3.87 
Note: A z score greater than 1.96 indicates a significant path. For all chi-square tests, df = 1, N = 70. NFI = Bentler-
Bonett Normed Fit Index. 
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Table 25 
Self Percee_tion: Parameter Estimates and Goodness of Fit of Four Structural Models by_ Status Graue_ for AIDS 
Status Group 
Non-Depressed Depressed 
Parameter Path z x2 p NFI Path z l p NFI 
Model 0 (saturated model) 
81: Path from responsibility to anger .83 14.55 .84 14.61 
82: Path from anger to change .48 2.83 .41 2.35 
83: Path from responsibility to change .09 0.54 -.06 -0.34 
Model 1 (emotion mediational model) .30 .59 1.0 .12 .73 1.0 
81: Path from responsibility to anger .83 14.55 .84 14.61 
82: Path from anger to change .56 6.67 .36 4.16 
Model 2 (independent effects) 97.59 .00 .26 98.03 .00 .14 
8 1: Path from responsibility to change .09 1.10 -.06 -0.70 
8 2: Path from anger to change .48 5.73 .41 4.77 
Model 3 (cognition mediational model) 7.67 .01 .94 5.37 .02 .95 
8 1: Path from anger to responsibility .91 14.55 .90 14.61 
82: Path from responsibility to change .49 5.76 .29 3.33 
Note: A z score greater than 1.96 indicates a significant path. For all chi-square tests, df = 1, N = 70. NFI = Bentler-
Bonett Normed Fit Index. 
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Table 26 
Self Percee_tion: Parameter Estimates and Goodness of Fit of Four Structural Models by_ Status Groue_ for Heart Disease 
Status Group 
Non-Depressed Depressed 
Parameter Path z x2 p NFI Path z x2 p NFI 
Model 0 (saturated model) 
8 1: Path from responsibility to anger .87 14.27 .83 11.0 
82: Path from anger to change .05 0.30 -.05 -0.39 
8 3: Path from responsibility to change .34 1.93 .42 3.09 
Model 1 (emotion mediational model) 3.67 .06 .97 9.05 .00 .90 
8 1: Path from responsibility to anger .87 14.27 .83 11.0 
82: Path from anger to change .34 3.84 .27 3.24 
Model2 (independent effects) 95.55 .00 .15 70.52 .00 .21 
8 1: Path from responsibility to change .34 3.85 .42 5.15 
82: Path from anger to change .05 0.61 -.05 -0.65 
Model 3 (cognition mediational model) .09 .76 1.0 .16 .69 1.0 
8 1: Path from anger to responsibility .87 14.27 .77 11.0 
82: Path from responsibility to change .38 4.38 .38 4.62 
Note: A z score greater than 1.96 indicates a significant path. For all chi-square tests, df = 1, N = 70. NFI = Bentler-
Bonett Normed Fit Index. 
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Table 27 
Self Percee.tion: Parameter Estimates and Goodness of Fit of Four Structural Models by_ Status Graue for Parae.leg_ia 
Status Group 
Non-Depressed Depressed 
Parameter Path z l p NFI Path z l p NFI 
Model 0 (saturated model) 
8 1: Path from responsibility to anger .85 14.22 .86 11.8 
82: Path from anger to change .60 3.23 .10 0.60 
83: Path from responsibility to change -.18 -0.98 .27 1.58 
Model1 (emotion mediational model) .97 .32 .99 2.47 .12 .97 
8 1: Path from responsibility to anger .85 14.22 .86 11.8 
82: Path from anger to change .44 4.72 .31 3.24 
Model2 (independent effects) 95.17 .00 .18 76.86 .00 .14 
8 1: Path from responsibility to change -.18 -1.96 .27 2.75 
82: Path from anger to change .60 6.44 .10 1.04 
Model3 (cognition mediational model) 9.86 .00 .91 .36 .55 1.0 
8 1: Path from anger to responsibility .88 14.22 .78 11.8 
82: Path from responsibility to change .33 3.37 .35 3.59 
Note: A z score greater than 1.96 indicates a significant path. For all chi-square tests, df = 1, N = 70. NFI =Bentler-
Bonett Normed Fit Index. 
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Appendix A: Person Perception - The Responsibility Judgement Model (Weiner, 1995) 
Controllable by Negative Behavior 




(Other is Victim) 
I 
Uncontrollable by ~ Prosocial Person II Sympathy II Behavior ("They're not (Helping) 
responsible") 
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Appendix B: Self Perception - Implications from Weiner's (1995) Responsibility Judgement Model 
Controllable by 
Me 





No Behavioral Negative Event I ~I Me II Sympathy II Change (Self is Victim) ("I'm not (Pity for self) (Passivity) responsible; no 
one is") 
~ 
Controllable by Negative Behavior 
Someone II Anger II Reaction ("I'm not (Avoidance) 
responsible; 
someone else is") 
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Appendix C 
BECK DEPRESSION INVENTORY 
On this questionnaire are a group of statements. Please read each 
group of statements carefully. Then pick out the one statement in each group 
which best describes the way you have been feeling the PAST WEEK, 
INCLUDING TODAY! Circle the number beside the statement you picked. If 
several statements in the group seem to apply equally well, circle each one. Be 
sure to read all the statements in each group before making your decision. 
1 0 I do not feel sad. 
1 I feel sad. 
2 I am sad all the time and I can't snap out of it. 
3 I am so sad or unhappy that I can't stand it. 
2 0 I am not particularly discouraged about the future. 
1 I feel discouraged about the future. 
2 I feel I have nothing to look forward to. 
3 I feel that the future is hopeless and that things cannot improve. 
3 0 I do not feel like a failure. 
1 I feel I have failed more than the average person. 
2 As I look back on my life, all I can see is a lot of failure. 
3 I feel I am a complete failure as a person. 
4 0 I get as much satisfaction out of things as I used to. 
1 I don't enjoy things the way I used to. 
2 I don't get real satisfaction out of anything anymore. 
3 I am dissatisfied or bored with everything. 
5 0 I don't feel particularly guilty. 
1 I feel guilty a good part of the time. 
2 I feel guilty most of the time. 
3 I feel guilty all of the time. 
6 0 I don't feel I am being punished. 
1 I feel I may be punished. 
2 I expect to be punished. 
3 I feel I am being punished. 
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7 0 I don't feel disappointed in myself . . 
1 I am disappointed in myself. 
2 I am disgusted with myself. 
3 I hate myself. 
8 0 I don't feel I am any worse than anybody else. 
1 I am critical of myself for my weaknesses or mistakes. 
2 I blame myself all the time for my faults . 
3 I blame myself for everything bad that happens. 
9 0 I don't have any thoughts of killing myself. 
1 I have thoughts of killing myself, but I would not carry them out. 
2 I would like to kill myself. 
3 I would kill myself if I had the chance. 
10 0 I don't cry anymore than usual. 
1 I cry more now than I used to. 
2 I cry all of the time now. 
3 I used to be able to cry, but now I can't cry even though I want to. 
11 0 I am no more irritated now than I ever am. 
1 I get annoyed or irritated more easily than I used to. 
2 I feel irritated all of the time now. 
3 I don't get irritated at all by the things that used to irritate me. 
12 0 I have not lost interest in other people. 
1 I am less interested in other people than I used to be. 
2 I have lost most of my interest in other people. 
3 I have lost all of my interest in other people. 
13 0 I make decisions about as well as I ever could. 
1 I put off making decisions more than I used to. 
2 I have greater difficulty in making decisions than before. 
3 I can't make decisions at all anymore. 
14 0 I don't feel I look any worse that I used to. 
1 I am worried that I an looking old or unattractive. 
2 I feel that there are permanent changes in my appearance that make me 
look unattractive. 
3 I believe that I look ugly. 
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15 0 I can work about as well as before. 
1 It takes an extra effort to get started at doing something. 
2 I have to push myself very hard to do anything. 
3 I can't do any work at all. 
16 0 I can sleep as well as usual. 
1 I don't sleep as well as I used to. 
2 I wake up 1-2 hours earlier than usual and find it very hard to get back to 
sleep. 
3 I wake up several hours earlier than I used to and cannot get back to 
slee . 
17 0 I don't get more tired than usual. 
1 I get tired more easily than I used to. 
2 I get tired from doing almost anything. 
3 I am too tired to do anything. 
18 0 My appetite is no worse than usual. 
1 My appetite is not as good as it used to be. 
2 My appetite is much worse now. 
3 I have no appetite at all anymore. 
19 0 I haven't lost much weight. 
1 I have lost more than 5 pounds 
2 I have lost more than 1 0 pounds 
3 I have lost more than 15 pounds 
I am purposefully trying to lose weight by eating less. Yes No 
20 0 I am no more worried about my health than usual. 
1 I am worried about physical problems such as aches and pains; or upset 
stomach; or constipation. 
2 I am very worried about physical problems and it is hard to think of much 
else. 
3 I am so worried about my physical problems, that I cannot think about 
anything else. 
21 0 I have not noticed any recent change in my interest in sex. 
1 I am less interested in sex than I used to be. 
2 I am much less interested in sex now. 
3 I have lost interest in sex completely. 
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Appendix D: Reasons for Misfortunes Questionnaires 
Reasons For Misfortune - Self 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
The items on the following pages present specific misfortunes or 
problems that might happen to anyone. For each item a cause is identified. 
Think about how you would respond if the misfortune happened to you for that 
reason. After reading each misfortune, rate that cause on each of the fifteen 
scales provided by circling one number on each scale. When doing the ratings, 
be sure to focus on the cause (that is, the reason for the onset) of the 
problem, NOT on the problem. This may be difficult at times. In other words, 
make sure you are rating the cause of the misfortune, and NOT the misfortune 
itself. 
The term "Other People" referred to in the rating questions means 
anvone else (that is, anvone other than you). 
Please take your time when doing the ratings - make sure you read the 
questions carefully. You may find that there is more than one way of interpreting 
some of the rating questions. Please interpret these questions in the way that is 
most meaningful to you. There are no right or wrong answers to these 
questions. 
To summarize, for each of the 4 misfortunes, you should: 
1) Read each misfortune and the reason/cause given for each one 
2) then, rate that cause by circling one number on each of the fifteen 
scales provided each time you do the ratings, be sure to focus on the 
cause (i.e., the reason for the problem), NOT on the problem. 
3) if you find there is more than one way of interpreting a question, 
interpret it in a way that is most meaningful to you. 
4) please read the questions carefully. 
PLEASE ANSWER ALL OF THE QUESTIONS. Keep in mind that 
there are no right or wrong answers. Please refer back to the instructions if 
you are unsure about what to do. It shoulcj take 10 minutes to finish this 
questionnaire. You are, of course, free to stop participating at any time. 
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1. Skin Cancer: 
Cause: something you inherited 
Think about only this cause of your developing skin cancer. The items below concern your impressions 
or opinions of only this cause. Circle one number on each of the following 15 scales. 
What do you think? 
How responsible are you for developing skin cancer? 
Completely responsible 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Not at all responsible 
Is the cause something: 
That reflects an aspect of you 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 Reflects an aspect of your situation 
Pennanent 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 Temporary 
You can regulate 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 You cannot regulate 
Over which others have power 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 Over which others have no power 
About you 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 About others 
Over which you have power 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 Over which you have no power 
Unchangeable 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 Changeable 
Other people can regulate 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 Other people cannot regulate 
How would you feel about yourself if inheritance was the cause of your developing skin cancer? 
Angry at yourself 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 
Sorry for yourself 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 
Sad for yourself 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 
What would you do? 
Do something to help yourself if you could 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 
Punish yourself if you could 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 
Change the way you act if you could 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 
Not at all angry at yourself 
Not at all sorry for yourself 
Not at all sad for yourself 
Do nothing to help yourself 
Not punish yourself 
Not change the way you act 
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2. AIDS: 
Cause: blood transfusion during an emergency operation 
Think about only this cause of your developing AIDS. The items below concern your impressions or 
opinions of only this cause. Circle one number on each of the following 15 scales. 
What do you think? . 
How responsible are you for developing AIDS? 
Completely responsible 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Not at all responsible 
Is the cause something: 
That reflects an aspect of you 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 Reflects an aspect of your situation 
Permanent 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 Temporary 
You can regulate 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 You cannot regulate 
Over which others have power 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 Over which others have no power 
About you 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 About others 
Over which you have power 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 Over which you have no power 
Unchangeable 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 Changeable 
Other people can regulate 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 Other people cannot regulate 
How would l£OU feel about l£Ourself if a blood transfusion during an emergencl£ o~ration was the 
cause of l£OUr developing AIDS? 
Angry at yourself 
Sorry for yourself 
Sad for yourself 
What would l£OU do? 
Do something to help yourself if you could 
Punish yourself if you could 
Change the way you act if you could 
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 
Not at all angry at yourself 
Not at all sorry for yourself 
Not at all sad for yourself 
Do nothing to help yourself 
Not punish yourself 
Not change the way you act 
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3. Paraplegia: 
Cause: rear-ended by a drunk driver 
Think about only this cause of your becoming a paraplegic. The items below concern your impressions 
or opinions of only this cause. Circle one number on each of the following 15 scales. 
What do YOU think? 
How responsible are you for becoming a paraplegic? 
Completely responsible 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Not at all responsible 
Is the cause something: 
That reflects an aspect of you 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 Reflects an aspect of your situation 
Permanent 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 Temporary 
You can regulate 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 You cannot regulate 
Over which others have power 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 Over which others have no power 
About you 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 About others 
Over which you have power 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 Over which you have no power 
Unchangeable 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 Changeable 
Other people can regulate 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 Other people cannot regulate 
How would l£OU feel about )£ourself if being rear-ended bl£ a drunk driver was the cause of l£OUr 
becoming a paraplegic? 
Angry at yourself 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 Not at all angry at yourself 
Sorry for yourself 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 Not at all sorry for yourself 
Sad for yourself 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 Not at all sad for yourself 
What would l£OU do? 
Do something to help yourself if you could 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 Do nothing to help yourself 
Punish yourself if you could 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 Not punish yourself 
Change the way you act if you could 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 Not change the way you act 
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4. Heart Disease: 
Cause: something you inherited 
Think about only this cause of your developing heart disease. The items below concern your impressions 
or opinions of only this cause. Circle one number on each of the following 15 scales. 
What do you think? 
How responsible are you for developing heart disease? 
Completely responsible 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 Not at all responsible 
Is the cause something: 
That reflects an aspect of you 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 Reflects an aspect of your situation 
Pennanent 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 Temporary 
You can regulate 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 You cannot regulate 
Over which others have power 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 Over which others have no power 
About you 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 About others 
Over which you have power 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 Over which you have no power 
Unchangeable 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 Changeable 
Other people can regulate 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 Other people cannot regulate 
How would you feel about yourself if inheritance was the cause of your developing heart disease? 
Angry at yourself 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 
Sorry for yourself 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
Sad for yourself 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 
What would you do? 
Do something to help yourself if you could 
Punish yourself if you could 
Change the way you act if you could 
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 
Not at all angry at yourself 
Not at all sorry for yourself 
Not at all sad for yourself 
Do nothing to help yourself 
Not punish yourself 
Not change the way you act 
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Reasons for Misfortune- Other 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
The items on the following pages present specific misfortunes or problems that 
might happen to anyone. For each item a cause is identified. Think about how you 
would respond if the misfortune happened to someone (other than yourself) for t~at 
reason. After reading each misfortune, rate that cause on each of the fifteen scales 
provided by circling one number on each scale. When doing the ratings, be sure to 
focus on the cause (that is, the reason for the onset) of the problem, NOT on the 
problem. This may be difficult at times. In other words, make sure you are rating the 
cause of the misfortune, and NOT the misfortune itself. 
"The person" referred to in the rating questions means the person who has the 
problem; the term "Other people" referred to in the ratings means anyone else (that is, 
anyone other than the person with the problem). 
Please take your time when doing the ratings - make sure you read the questions 
carefully. You may find that there is more than one way of interpreting some of the 
rating questions. Please interpret these questions in the way that is most meaningful to 
you. There are no right or wrong answers t~ these questions. 
To summarize, for each of the 4 misfortunes, you should: 
1) Read each misfortune and the reason/cause given for each one 
2) then, rate that cause by circling one number on each of the fifteen scales 
provided- each time you do the ratings, be sure to focus on the cause (i.e., the 
reason for the problem), NOT on the problem. 
3) if you find there is more than one way of interpreting a question, interpret it in a 
way that is most meaningful to you. 
4) please read the questions carefully. 
PLEASE ANSWER ALL OF THE QUESTIONS. Keep in mind that there are 
no right or wrong answers. Please refer back to the instructions if you are unsure 
about what to do. It should take 10 minutes to finish this questionnaire. You are, of 
course, free to stop participating at any time. 
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1. Skin Cancer: 
Cause: excessive sun-tanning 
Think about only this cause of this person developing skin cancer. The items below concern your 
impressions or opinions of only this cause. Circle one number on each of the following 15 scales. 
What do you think? 
How responsible is this person for developing skin cancer? 
Completely responsible 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Not at all responsible 
Is the cause something: 
That reflects an aspect the person 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 Reflects an aspect of their situation 
Permanent 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 Temporary 
The person can regulate 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 The person cannot regulate 
Over which others have power 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 Over which others have no power 
About the person 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 About others 
Over which the person has power 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 Over which the person has no power 
Unchangeable 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 Changeable 
Other people can regulate 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 Other people cannot regulate 
How would you feel about the person if excessive sun-tanning was the cause of their developing 
skin cancer? 
Angry at the person 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 Not at all angry at the person 
Sorry for the person 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 Not at all sorry for the person 
Sad for the person 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 Not at all sad for the person 
What would you do? 
Do something to help the person if you could 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 Do nothing to help the person 
Avoid the person if you could 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 Not avoid the person if you could 
Encourage the person to change the way they act if 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 Not encourage the person to change the way 
you could they act 
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2. AIDS: 
Cause: promiscuous sex (unprotected) 
Think about only this cause of this person developing AIDS. The items below concern your impressions 
or opinions of only this cause. Circle one number on each of the following 15 scales. 
What do you think? 
How responsible is this person for developing AIDS? 
Completely responsible 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Not at all responsible 
Is the cause something: 
That reflects an aspect the person 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 Reflects an aspect of their situation 
Permanent 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 Temporary 
The person can regulate 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 The person cannot regulate 
Over which others have power 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 Over which others have no power 
About the person 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 About others 
Over which the person has power 9. 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 Over which the person has no power 
Unchangeable 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 Changeable 
Other people can regulate 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 Other people cannot regulate 
How would you feel about the person if promiscuous sex (unprotected) was the cause of their 
developing AIDS? 
Angry at the person 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 
Sorry for the person 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
Sad for the person 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 
What would you do? 
Do something to help the person if you could 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 
Avoid the person if you could 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 
Encourage the person to change the way they act if 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 
you could 
Not at all angry at the person 
Not at all sorry for the person 
Not at all sad for the person 
Do nothing to help the person 
Not avoid the person if you could 
Not encourage the person to change the way 
they act 
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3. Paraplegia: 
Cause: jumping off a cliff into the lake for fun 
Think about only this cause of this person becoming a paraplegic. The items below concem your 
impressions or opinions of only this cause. Circle one number on each of the following 15 scales. 
What do you think? 
How responsible is this person for becoming a paraplegic? 
Completely responsible 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Not at all responsible 
Is the cause something: 
That reflects an aspect the person 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 Reflects an aspect of their situation 
Permanent 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 Temporary 
The person can regulate 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 The person cannot regulate 
Over which others have power 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 Over which others have no power 
About the person 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 About others 
Over which the person has power 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 Over which the person has no power 
Unchangeable 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 Changeable 
Other people can regulate 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 Other people cannot regulate 
How would you feel about the person if lumping off a cliff into the lake for fun was the cause of 
their becoming paraplegic? 
Angry at the person 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 Not at all angry at the person 
Sorry for the person 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Not at all sorry for the person 
Sad for the person 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 Not at all sad for the person 
What would you do? 
Do something to help the person if you could 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 Do nothing to help the person 
Avoid the person if you could 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 Not avoid the person if you could 
Encourage the person to change the way they act if 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 Not encourage the person to change the way 
you could they act 
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4. Heart Disease: 
Cause: excessive smoking and bad diet 
Think about only this cause of this person developing heart disease. The items below concern your 
impressions or opinions of only this cause. Circle one number on each of the following 15 scales. 
What do YOU think? 
How responsible is this person for developing heart disease? 
Completely responsible 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 Not at all responsible 
Is the cause something: 
That reflects an aspect the person 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 Reflects an aspect of their situation 
Permanent 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 Temporary 
The person can regulate 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 The person cannot regulate 
Over which others have power 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 Over which others have no power 
About the person 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 About others 
Over which the person has power 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 Over which the person has no power 
Unchangeable 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 Changeable 
Other people can regulate 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 Other people cannot regulate 
How would xou feel about the eerson if excessive smoking and bad diet was the cause of their 
develoeing heart disease? 
Angry at the person 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 Not at all angry at the person 
Sorry for the person 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 Not at all sorry for the person 
Sad for the person 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 Not at all sad for the person 
What would xou do? 
Do something to help the person if you could 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 Do nothing to help the person 
Avoid the person if you could 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 Not avoid the person if you could 
Encourage the person to change the way they act if 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 Not encourage the person to change the way 
you could they act 
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Appendix E: Happiness Measure Scale 
EMOTIONS QUESTIONNAIRE 
PART I DIRECTIONS: 
Use the list below to answer the following question: In general, how happy or unhappy have you felt 
over the past week (including today)? Check the one statement below that best describes your 
average happiness. 
__ 10. Extremely happy (feeling ecstatic, joyous, fantastic!) 
9. Very Happy (feeling really good, elated!) 
8. Pretty Happy (spirits high, feeling good.) 
7. Mildly happy (feeling fairly good and somewhat cheerful.) 
6. Slightly happy Oust a bit above neutral.) 
5. Neutral (not particularly happy or unhappy.) 
4. Slightly unhappy Oust a bit below neutral.) 
3. Mildly unhappy Oust a little low.) 
2. Pretty unhappy (somewhat "blue", spirits down.) 
1. Very unhappy (depressed, spirits very low.) 
0. Extremely unhappy (utterly depressed, completely down.) 
PART II DIRECTIONS: 
Consider your emotions a moment further. On the average, what percent of the time have you felt happy 
over the past week (including today)? What percent of the time did you feel unhappy? What percent of 
the time did you feel neutral (neither happy nor unhappy)? Write down your best estimates, as well as you 
can, in the space below. Make sure the three figures add-up to equal100%. 
ON THE AVERAGE: 
The percent of time I felt happy % 
The percent of time I felt unhappy % 
The percent of time I felt neutral % 
TOTAL: 100% 
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PROFILE SHEET FOR HAPPINESS MEASURES 
The scale score and the three percentage estimates are used directly as raw scores. The combination 
score= [scale sco reX 10 +happy%] I 2. 
Intensity {I) Frequency {F) 
Scale Score 




















































Raw Scores ___ _ 
0 - 0 -
5 
10 10 - -
15 20 - -
20 
25 - 30 -
30 - 40 -
35 - 50 -
40 -
45 - 60 -
50 70 - -
55 -
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Appendix G: Model1 (Emotion Mediational Model) 
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Appendix 1: Model3 (Cognition Mediational Model) 
--- Cognitive Appraisal - Action --
